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ABSTRACT  
DAVER CUNEYT KAHVECIOGLU: Two Essays on Life Cycle Models 
(Under the direction of David Blau)  
 
 
This dissertation consists of two essays. In “A Life-Cycle Model: Retirement, Savings, and Portfolio 
Allocation”, I analyze the interrelationships among retirement, saving, and asset allocation. I show that optimal 
portfolio allocation can be very sensitive to plans about retirement timing and to the presence and characteristics 
of Social Security. I also show how portfolio decisions have impact on when to retire. In order to take into 
account these important effects, Social Security reform proposals should be evaluated with models that 
incorporate portfolio choice. 
In the second essay, “Asset Allocation, Bequests, and Wealth Dynamics of the Elderly”, I build and estimate a 
life cycle model of asset allocation and saving with a fixed cost of stock market entry, medical expenditure risk, 
and a general bequest function that captures risk preferences over bequests. The estimates imply that there is no 
operative bequest motive, and that medical expenditure risk is a very strong motivation for saving at older ages. 
Even though the model explains reasonably well both the observed average age profiles and the heterogeneity in 
saving and portfolio allocation, the cross-equation restrictions that are required for internal consistency are 
strongly rejected. This is mainly due to the fact that, in constant relative risk aversion utility, a single parameter 
- coefficient of relative risk aversion - governs both wealth and portfolio paths. While a very high level of risk 
aversion is required to explain portfolio choices, a very low level of risk aversion is required to explain wealth 
dynamics. Despite its internal inconsistency, the model is one of the richest versions of the standard model and I 
use the estimates to do some policy simulations with caution. I used the estimates to simulate the impact of 
reducing the Social Security benefit of a 70-year old female retiree by a specific amount, and giving her a lump 
sum equal to the expected present discounted value of the benefit cut, which is to be invested in her individual 
account. I find that this reform would be undesirable. Main reason behind this is that, most retirees are either 
optimally annuitized or under-annuitized. 
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A Life Cycle Model: Retirement, Savings, and Portfolio Allocation 
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1.    Introduction 
 
 
There is a large and growing literature in finance on life-cycle household portfolio allocation. Even 
though this literature1 recently acknowledges that labor income may have a big role to play, it ignores the fact 
that retirement is a choice and treats it as given. On the other hand, in the economics literature, the portfolio mix 
has been treated as given or has been ignored altogether in the models of labor supply and retirement behavior.2 
 
In this paper, I analyze the interrelationships among retirement behavior, savings, and portfolio mix by 
modeling these decisions as being made jointly. In particular, I am interested in how the optimal patterns of life-
cycle portfolio allocation are affected by introducing retirement as a choice variable. That information will help 
assess the validity of asset allocation advice provided by portfolio managers to the people who are saving for 
retirement. Another interesting question that I will explore is whether and to what extent the presence and 
characteristics of Social Security affect optimal household portfolio allocations. This is quite important in view 
of the current debate about incorporating individual accounts into Social Security. The model proposed in this 
paper could be used to analyze the impact of a Social Security reform that introduces individual accounts, while 
models that treat the timing of retirement or asset allocation as given would be poorly suited for such an 
analysis.  Predicting baby boomers' portfolio allocations will also be helpful in forecasting the future trends in 
the stock market since they will be holding a significant amount of national wealth. 
 
I have solved and simulated a relatively simple version of the model. I find similar results to the 
previous literature when I consider retirement as given. However, if retirement is a choice, I demonstrate that 
the model predicts richer and different life-cycle patterns. It is shown that the optimal portfolio allocation can be 
very sensitive to expectations about the timing of retirement. Additionally, I show that the presence and 
characteristics of Social Security can be very influential on optimal portfolio allocations as well. 
 
                                                 
1Gomes and Michaelides, 2003; Bertaut and Haliassos, 1997; Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout, 2001; Svensson 1988; Viceira 
2001; Vissing-Jorgensen 1999 to name a few.  
 
2One exception is MaCurdy (1985). He analyses hours of work (in contrast, my paper analyses labor force participation 
decision).  
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The rest of the paper is as follows: In section 2, I review the previous work done on the household life-
cycle portfolio allocation. The theoretical model is described in section 3. Model’s solution and its implications 
are presented and discussed in the same section. Section 4 concludes. 
 
 
2.    Literature Review 
 
I summarize the relevant literature below. Note that none of the papers discussed here treats retirement, 
savings, and portfolio choice as decisions being made jointly. 
 
Addressing the problem of portfolio choice over the life-cycle dates back to the seminal papers, 
Samuelson (1969) and Merton (1969). They showed that optimal portfolio allocation is independent of both age 
and wealth. The agents in their model should hold a positive fraction of their wealth in risky assets and this ratio 
is fixed over the lifetime and over the level of wealth. It is now known that this result is sensitive to the papers' 
assumptions (some of them were implicitly assumed in the papers). As explained in Ameriks and Zeldes (2001), 
among those assumptions are: (1) asset returns are independently and identically distributed over time, (2) 
households have utility functions that exhibit constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) and that are time-invariant 
and additively separable over time, (3) markets are frictionless and complete. 
 
There was no labor income in Samuelson's (1969) model. However, without violating any of the above 
3 assumptions Merton (1971) adds a labor income process to the model and the qualitative results do not 
change. Introduction of labor income to portfolio choice models was somewhat trivial if the following two 
conditions are satisfied as in Merton (1971): 1) Labor income is treated as income from traded 3 human wealth, 
that is investors are allowed to borrow against their human capital. 2) Human wealth is assumed to be nontraded 
but traded assets provide perfect hedges against labor income. In other words, investors are able to fully insure 
                                                 
3The existence of nontraded assets can be the result of various market imperfections which may be caused by transactions 
cost, moral hazard, legal restrictions like capital controls. As explained in Svensson (1988), an individual cannot trade 
claims to his future wages (his human capital) for obvious moral hazard reasons. 
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their labor income risk. Note that labor supply was not endogenous in Merton (1971). Bodie, Merton and 
Samuelson (1991) extend that model by including leisure as a second good and hence endogenizing labor 
supply, but they assume that retirement occurs at a fixed age and that households can borrow against their future 
labor income. As I will explain below, both of these assumptions are dropped in this dissertation since they are 
unrealistic. They focus only on the relationship between labor supply flexibility and portfolio choice.4 They find 
that flexibility of labor supply leads to higher shares of the risky asset in the optimal portfolio allocation.  
 
The more recent articles solve for optimal portfolio allocation patterns with at least one of those 
assumptions relaxed. Some articles assess whether the observed household behavior is attributable to the more 
realistic models. Cocco, Gomez and Maenhout (2001) points out that many households cannot capitalize future 
labor income and hence face borrowing constraints due to moral hazard issues. Moreover, they also face 
uninsurable labor income risk since explicit insurance markets for labor income risk are not well-developed. 
The authors consider a finitely-lived investor facing mortality risk, borrowing and short-sale constraints, and 
receiving labor income. The agent can invest in a risky asset or a riskless asset. Using the PSID they estimate 
the labor income profile and its risk characteristics and then calibrate and solve numerically for the optimal 
portfolio and savings decisions. Stock returns are allowed to be correlated with labor income shocks. They find 
that the optimal share of stocks in the portfolio goes down as agents age and as wealth increases, in contrast to 
the findings of Samuelson and Merton. This is very similar to my model except in my model retirement is 
endogenous. I will show that if I take retirement as given then I obtain similar results as theirs, but treating 
retirement as a choice variable changes the monotonicity of the share of risky assets with respect to wealth and 
age. 
 
Ameriks and Zeldes (2001) examine the empirical relationship between age and portfolio choice using 
new panel data from TIAA-CREF and pooled cross-sectional data from the Surveys of Consumer Finances. 
They document significant non-stockownership, wide-ranging heterogeneity in allocation choices, and the 
infrequency of active portfolio allocation changes. 
                                                 
4They propose that labor supply flexibility can be measured by the number of adults in the household, or having an 
occupation that offers opportunities for working extra hours, taking extra jobs, or delaying retirement. Benitez-Silva (2003) 
tests their hypothesis using panel data from the HRS. 
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Most of the rest of the literature describing and analyzing the dependency of portfolio allocation on age 
has a common motivation: Solving the micro-level equity premium puzzle. There are patterns in data that are 
inconsistent with portfolio theory: There is a very sizable fraction of the U.S. population5 that does not hold any 
equities. Papers in this literature have added uninsurable labor income (which may or may not be correlated 
with asset returns), permanent and temporary wage shocks, non i.i.d. asset returns, borrowing constraints, short 
selling constraints, fixed costs for stock market entry, transaction costs for stock trading, and others in attempts 
to try to solve the puzzle. 
 
Using data from the PSID and other data sets Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) estimates a dynamic panel data 
model of stock market participation and equity share in portfolios controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and 
the endogeneity of initial conditions. She focuses on the effects of the first and second moments of non-
financial income and costs of stock market participation on stock market participation and on equity shares in 
household portfolios. She finds that both of them contribute to the explanation of the puzzle. She finds evidence 
of a positive effect of mean non-financial income on the probability of stock market participation and on the 
proportion of wealth invested in stocks conditional on being a participant. Variance of non-financial income is 
found to have the opposite effect on those two variables. She also finds evidence of state dependence in the 
stock market participation decision, a result that is consistent with the theory that small fixed costs for stock 
market entry may deter stockholding. In her study, labor income is treated as given. 
 
Haliassos and Michaelides (2001) show that the puzzle is robust to relaxations of the benchmark 
assumptions of Samuelson (1969). They find that assuming that there is a relatively small fixed costs for stock 
market participation may help explain the puzzle. They state that such costs can arise from informational 
considerations, sign-up fees, and investor inertia. 
 
The timing of retirement, and thus, to some extent, labor income is not given. Households may adjust 
their labor supply as events unfold over the life-cycle. Social insurance programs such as Social Security, 
                                                 
5This is true for European countries too. See Guiso, Haliassos, and Jappelli (2001). 
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Disability Insurance, Medicaid, Medicare and the others have the potential to influence savings, retirement 
timing, and portfolio choice behavior because they affect the riskiness and amount of current and future income. 
Hence it is crucial to model these three decisions jointly. As I will demonstrate in the next section, optimal 
portfolio allocation can be very sensitive to plans about retirement timing and to the presence and characteristics 
of the Social Security. 
 
 
3.    Theoretical Model 
 
 The agent in the model has a finite horizon, T with discrete time t = 1,...,T. Each period corresponds to 
one year. The agent dies at T+1 with certainty and there is no risk of death prior to T+1. There is no bequest 
motive. Suppose T is 10. 
 
There are three decision variables: Employment, consumption/saving, and portfolio allocation. There is 
one risk-free, and one risky asset over which the portfolio decision is made. Wage offers and portfolio returns 
are stochastic. 
 
At the beginning of each period, the agent observes the return shock that applies to his assets carried 
over from the previous period and so determines his beginning-of-period assets. At the same time he observes 
the wage offer for current period employment. He then decides whether to be employed or not, how much to 
consume, and if he decides to hold financial assets, what the portfolio allocation is. Note that I do not consider 
the hours of work decision. Since there is one risky and one risk-free asset, I define his portfolio decision to be 
simply the ratio of his financial wealth held in the risky asset to his total financial wealth. 
 
Choice Variable 1: Employment 
 



=
t periodin  employed not     0 
t periodin  employed     1 
t
j  
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Choice Variable 2: Consumption 
*
t
AtItAtC −+=  where Ct is consumption, It is income, At is assets at the beginning of period t, 
and
*
tA  is assets at the end of t. 
 
Choice Variable 3: Portfolio Allocation 
 
In the following definition, xt is the fraction of financial wealth held in the risky asset. That is a measure of the 
riskiness of the portfolio. 
 
*
tA
tZ
tMtZ
tZ
tx =+
=
  
 
where Zt = xt At* is the amount of risky asset held and Mt = (1-xt)At* is the amount of risk-free asset held. 
 
 
RETURNS: 
 
*
1-tA
tR
]1-txtz)1-tx(1t[rtA 4444 34444 21
+−=    
 
The returns on the risky asset (z) and on the risk-free asset (r) are realized at the beginning of the next period. 
 
θ tztz +=      )
2
θ
σi.i.d.N(0,~tθ  
 
rt is fixed and non-stochastic 
 
   
 
8
For simplicity, I assume that return shocks and wage shocks are uncorrelated. 
 
 
INCOME: 
 
If the agent works, he earns labor income that depends on experience. If the agent does not work, he 
may be eligible for pension payments that depend on his labor market experience. In the current model, an agent 
cannot collect benefits and work simultaneously. Hence income is 
 
t)Btj(1tWtjtI −+=  
 
where labor income is tηte1β0βtW ++=  where et is experience at the beginning of period 
t, and ηt ~ i.i.d. N(0,ση2). 
 
Social Security/Pension Income is deterministic and collected only if not employed: 
 
 t),tB(etB =  
 
In the simulations, I set B(e,t) = 0 for e<6; B(6,t) = 5, B(7,t) = 10, B(8,t) = 12, and B(9,t) = 15. 
Benefits are in $000’s. Note that this schedule is a crude approximation to the Social Security benefit rules by 
requiring a minimum number of work periods for any benefit, providing a relatively low benefit for early 
retirement (t = 7, e = 6), and increasing benefits with experience beyond the experience required for normal 
retirement (t=8, e=7). Social Security taxes are not modeled. 
 
There is a consumption floor C , which is provided by welfare programs to guarantee C  units of 
consumption if the agent does not have enough cash-in-hand (assets + income). 
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 if  CtItA <+ ,  then  
0
*
tA
CtC
=
=
 
 
Hubbard, Skinner, Zeldes (1995) show that the presence of means-tested social insurance policies 
designed to maintain consumption has a large negative effect on saving for lower-lifetime-income groups. 
 
 
CONSTRAINTS: 
 
 
 x in [0,1]:  no short-selling of the risky 
   asset; no borrowing 
 
 ⇒  Z ≥ 0, and M ≥ 0. 
                                     
                                    where Z is the amount of 
                        the risky asset and M is the    
                        amount of the risk-free asset. 
 
 
 
A in the above equations is a given constant. I used A = 0 in my simulations, hence I assume that 
individuals start period 1 with no assets. 
 
 
UTILITY FUNCTION: 
 
t10
α1
jt
jt t)jγ(γ
α1
C
U ++
−
=
−
  CRRA with parameter α 
 
Most of the studies use CRRA utility functions including the seminal article of Samuelson in 1969. 
Choosing the same type of function facilitates the comparison of my results to the other results documented in 
the literature. 
 
CIA For ≥+  CIA For <+  
AA
[0,1]x
0A
0C
1
*
=
∈
≥
≥
 
AA
0A
CC
1
*
=
=
=
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Being employed gives a negative utility to the agent (γ0 < 0), which increases with age (γ1 < 0). Dislike 
for work is the reason agents retire in this model. Inclusion of disutility of work provides a motive for the agents 
to save: saving for retirement. At some point in time they will choose not to work anymore because of the 
disutility of working, and they will save for retirement since they are forward-looking. They will also save some 
amount due to precaution and intertemporal substitution. 
 
 The utility function is additively separable in utility from consumption and leisure. It is straightforward 
to modify the function so that it becomes non-separable. 
 
Agents maximize the expected present discounted value of lifetime utility by choosing j (employment), 
C (consumption), and x (portfolio mix) at each period t from 1 to T. They discount the future with the discount 
factor δ. 
 
 
3.1. Solving the Model 
 
The model is solved by backward recursion starting from the last period, T. Since there is no analytic 
solution of the model I solve it numerically. There are 3 state variables: t (age), et (beginning-of-period 
experience), and COHt (beginning-of-period cash-on-hand). Cash-on-hand is defined as assets plus income 
(either labor or non-labor). If both of them were serially correlated, then we would have to have 2 additional 
state variables: the wage shock and return shock. As a special case, I also solve the model assuming that there is 
no Social Security and that wages do not depend on experience. Then, experience is no longer a state variable. 
 
Starting in period T, going backwards to period 1, the model must be solved at every point in the state 
space, that is, for every feasible combination of t, e, COH, and j6. However, since COH is a continuous variable, 
                                                 
6Note that, actually, j is not a state variable, yet it is treated as if it is one. That is done to save computation time. Instead of 
looping over beginning-of-period assets and labor income, I only loop over cash-on-hand. The downside is that I have to 
loop over employment too, because given cash-on-hand we do not know whether the agent is employed or not. Let's say 
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I discretize it as COH[n], n = 1,...,N. I partitioned the interval of feasible cash-on-hand into 200 subintervals. 
The lower end point of the interval is 0. To calculate the other end point of the grid, I calculate the maximum 
possible cash-on-hand. I find this number by assuming that the agent receives the highest wage shock (out of 
10,000 draws) at current and all previous periods, then saves it all in the form of risky assets and gets the 
highest possible return (out of 10,000 draws) in the current and all previous periods. Then I divide this range 
into 200 intervals that are smaller towards the lower end but get larger towards the upper end. 
It is very unlikely that the agents will have cash-on-hand that is close to the maximum possible one. Hence the 
grid is set in such a way that there are more intervals close to the left end point, 0, that is, the grid is coarser 
toward the end. Whenever I need to calculate the value of a variable (for example, value function) at some COH 
value, which is not at one of COH grid points, I use interpolation. 
 
Period T:  
 
In the last period, the model is solved at every point in the state space (that is, for all feasible 
combinations of t, e, n, and j). Since there is no bequest and the agent is going to die at the end of this period 
with certainty, there is neither a savings nor portfolio decision to make. Optimal consumption equals cash-on-
hand. 
 
Period T-1:  
 
For each e, n, and j we calculate the consumption and portfolio mix that maximizes the value function: 
 
)]}(max[)({max),( 111
]1,0[
],0[1
1
1
111
1
T
j
TjTT
j
T
x
IAC
j
T CUECUneV T
T
T
T
TTT
T
−−−
∈
+∈
−
+= −
−
−−−
− δ
 
 
where, 
                                                                                                                                                       
there are N grid points for COH (asset+income), P grid points for income (if it was used as a state variable), and 2 points for 
j. As long as Nx2 is smaller than NxP, using only COH as a state variable will save significant computation time. 
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},max{ CIAC TTT += , 
*
111 ])1([ −−− +−= TTTTTT AxzxrA , 
TTTTT BjWjI )1( −+= , 111
*
1 −−−− −+= TTTT CIAA . 
 
The last term in the above optimization expression is the discounted expected value of last period value 
function in T-1. It is, 
 
θηθη ddfVVEVE TTjT
j
j
T
j
TTT
T
T
T
T
∫∫== −− ),(}{maxmax11  
 
where f(.,.) is a joint probability density function. This integral is evaluated using monte carlo simulation. 
Tj
TV is a function of the period-T shocks, and the previous period consumption and portfolio mix decisions. 
Once those decisions are made, we know the value of end-of-period assets that is carried over to period T. Then 
for a number of random draws from the distributions of wage and return shocks, we can calculate the amount 
available for consumption. Since agents consume all cash-on-hand in period T, we calculate the period-T-value 
function by plugging cash-on-hand in place of C. Averaging over all of the random draws of shocks, we obtain 
an approximation of the expected value of the period-T-value function. As the number of draws increases, the 
approximation converges to the true value. 
 
The above algorithm is applied for an equally partitioned two-dimensional grid of consumption and 
portfolio mix values. 7  Then we search for the pair for which the T-1 value function is maximized. Hence, we 
obtain optimal consumption and portfolio decisions for each point in (eT-1 ,nT-1 ,jT-1 ) space. I also calculate the 
percentage saved (variable sper) out of cash-on-hand using the consumption values. The variable sper will be 
                                                 
7I use this simple grid search instead of solving the euler equations for the exact optimal values of C and X for the following 
two reasons: 1) To numerically solve the euler equation, we need to solve two highly nonlinear equations simultaneously. I 
have tried numerous algorithms and none of them produced reliable results. 2) Solving the model at every grid point and 
saving the results enables us to gain further insight into the dynamics of the model since we can graph the value functions 
for their entire domain. This feature of grid search and the use of Monte Carlo integration over distributions came in handy 
when I encountered seemingly odd decision rules such as jumps in optimal consumption and portfolio allocation. 
   
 
13
used in order to interpolate for consumption during simulation. The results are saved to be used in period T-2 
calculations and in simulations.  
 
Although in similar studies the number of draws used in evaluating integrals is less than 100, I used 
10,000 draws. Particularly, the portfolio decision is very sensitive to the number of draws used. There were 
substantial differences between the portfolio allocation solutions (not consumption or employment solutions) 
when I used 100, 1,000, or 10,000 draws. 
 
Periods T-k, k = 2, … ,T-1: 
 
As in period T-1, for each e, n, and j we calculate the consumption and portfolio mix that maximizes 
the value function: 
 
)]}1(11
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In contrast to value function calculations in T-1, for periods T-k, k>1, we do not readily know what the 
next period optimal choices are given current period optimal choices. In period T-1, next period is the last 
period, and we already know that optimal consumption is all of cash-on-hand and there is no portfolio allocation 
decision. In periods T-2 and earlier, however, we do not know the next period optimal decision for all the 
possible current period decisions. We have calculated and saved only a grid of them. We use an interpolation 
algorithm to find the values that are not on the grid points but somewhere in between. For the value function 
(especially for power utility functions), an interpolation algorithm based on weighted geometric mean proves to 
be “accurate”. For given trial values of consumption and X in T-k, I first find the cash-on-hand available in the 
next period. Then find the subinterval that includes this value. Then I interpolate for the value of the value 
function at this point by using the already calculated and saved function values at the end points of this interval. 
The distances of this point to the end points are used as weights in the weighted geometric average calculations. 
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I have tried a number of interpolation algorithms, and found out that this is most appropriate. This method is 
better than interpolation based on weighted arithmetic means because for power utility functions it can be 
shown that the absolute error for weighted geometric mean is always smaller than the one for weighted 
arithmetic mean. I have tried all the interpolation routines in the IMSL package and found out that none of them 
are “true” enough to the shape of this kind of utility function. 
 
 
4.    Simulations 
 
Simulation of the solution of the model will be useful to get a sense of what kind of behavior the 
agents exhibit during their life courses. Analyzing the solution at each period separately will of course reveal 
the most amount of information about the model, but this is more tedious. So I left analyzing the solution to the 
next section. In this section, I only focus on the simulation of the solution keeping in mind that we get a limited 
insight into the model but a good overview of the model. I present 2 sets of simulation results: One without 
Social Security and one with Social Security. In the simulations, I tried to choose all the parameters in a way 
such that we have a chance to observe the roles played by the main features of the model. 
 
Using the solution that is described above, the model is simulated for 10,000 agents who are identical 
at the beginning of the first period. I describe and explain the solution path for the decision variables over the 
life cycle. 
 
During simulation, for the values of state variables that fall somewhere in between the grid points that 
were used in the solution, appropriate interpolation methods are used. First, given the beginning-of-period 
assets, return shock, and wage offer, cash-on-hand is calculated for both for employment and non-employment. 
Value functions are calculated for both values of employment. I use the same weighted geometric average 
interpolation algorithm that I used in the solution. Then, the employment value that gives a higher value to the 
agent is selected. Now that we know cash-on-hand, we go back to the solution where optimal consumption (or 
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optimal sper, i.e. percentage saved out of cash-on-hand) and portfolio decisions were calculated for the grid of 
all feasible cash-on-hand values. The sper value corresponding to the closest point on the cash-on-hand grid is 
the interpolated sper. As will be explained later, true sper may display “jumps” at some cash-on-hand values. 
Those jumps are important (they are presented and explained below) and by interpolating sper using the simple 
scheme described above we preserve the jumps. Had I used a weighted average of the 2 closest points, I may 
have undermined the size of the jumps. We do not need to worry about the size of the error this method causes 
because sper is smooth except at those “jump” points, I use a fine grid, and using percentages instead of values 
already has a smoothing effect. Given sper, we calculate optimal consumption. To find the interpolated 
portfolio mix, we find the portfolio mix value corresponding to the closest point on the cash-on-hand grid. That 
value is assigned as the optimal portfolio mix. The same method is applied in calculating the probabilities of 
future employment sequences. 
 
 Here is a chart that illustrates these steps more clearly: 
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Table 1: How the Simulation Is Done 
 
Starting Values: A1 = A0* 
x1 = x0  
e1 = 0 
 
Starting values are given. 
In my simulations A0*=0 
and x0=0.5 
For each t θt  
ηt  
 
Rate of return shock and 
wage offer shock are 
drawn 
 zt = zt + θt 
 
Rt = rt(1-xt) + ztxt-1 
 
Wt = β0+β1et+ηt 
 
Rate of return on the 
risky asset is determined 
 
Overall portfolio rate of 
return is calculated 
 
Wage offer is calculated 
 For each  j 
(employment status) 
Itj=Wtjt+B(et,t)(1-jt) 
COHtj = At + Itj 
 
Vtj(COHtj) 
Income and 
Cash-on-hand are 
determined 
 
Value function values are 
interpolated  using the 
results saved from 
solution 
 
      1 if Vtj=1 ≥ Vtj=0 
jt =  
      0 otherwise 
 
 
Employment Status is 
determined 
 sper(COHt) 
 
xt(COHt) 
 
At*=sper . COHt 
 
Ct = (1 - sper).COHt 
 
Percentage saved (sper) 
and 
portfolio allocation (xt) 
are interpolated using the 
results saved from 
solution 
 
End-of-period asset, 
 
Consumption are 
determined 
 
 
 
 
4.1.    Simulations without Social Security 
 
 
Horizon: T = 10 
Constant relative risk aversion parameter: α = 4 
Time preference: 0.98 (~1/1.02) 
   
 
17
Consumption floor: C = 1 (this is set to a very small value in order to concentrate on understanding how the 
model works without the complication that the consumption floor introduces.) 
Wage function: β0 = 20, β1 = 0, ση = 1 (Average wage is $20,000, wages do not depend on experience, and the 
standard deviation of wages is $1,000. I am modeling the decisions of 50+ year olds and since their wage-
experience profile should be relatively flat β1=0 is not a bad assumption. Besides, I get rid of one state variable 
(experience) in the case where there is no social security since nothing depends on experience.) 
Disutility of work: γ0 = -0.0004, γ1 = -0.00002 (These values are selected to be able to see realistic life-cycle 
patterns among the agents. If these were too high in absolute value, then the agent would work only if he 
receives an unrealistically big wage shock. In this case almost of them will be on welfare. On the other hand, if 
these were too low in absolute value then almost all of the agents would work all the time.) 
Risky asset returns: z = 1.04, σθ = 0.2 (hence, most of the time: z is in [0.54,1.54]. There were a total of 
100,000 draws in the simulations (t=10)x10,000, and the maximum realized asset return was 186% and the 
minimum realized asset return was –85%. 
Risk-free asset return: r = 1.03 (The values selected for the asset returns are somewhat atypical compared to the 
similar studies. Usually the average rate of return is taken to be around 8% for the risky asset and around 2% for 
risk-free asset. I have chosen the returns of these assets to be unrealistically close to each other. Had I chosen 
them to be further away from each other almost all the agents would be investing 100% of their portfolios in the 
risky asset with such a low value for the constant relative risk aversion parameter (4). That is the equity 
premium puzzle. I get similar "puzzling" results if I set the equity premium high. Since analyzing life-cycle 
patterns for portfolio allocation is the main objective of this study, I set the means of the two assets to be close 
to each other.  
 
Number of points in the cash-on-hand grid: 200 
 
Since I have searched for the optimum for consumption and portfolio allocation in an equally partitioned grid 
(201 grid points for consumption in the interval (0,Cash-on-hand], and 101 grid points in the interval [0,1] for 
portfolio allocation, we know that the errors cannot be greater than twice the distance of neighboring grid 
points: 
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Maximum possible error for consumption solution (C): 0.5% of cash-on-hand 
Maximum possible error for portfolio allocation solution (X): 0.01 (1%) 
Number of draws for monte carlo simulations: 10,000 
Initial Assets: 0 
 
There is no serial or cross-sectional correlation within or among the error terms. 
 
Below, Figures 1,2, and 3 show the paths of the important variables: employment rate, average 
consumption, assets, income, and portfolio allocation by age. 
 
 
4.1.1. Retirement 
 
Retirement patterns show a great deal of variation although most of the simulated agents follow a 
"normal" life-cycle employment sequence: They work until a certain age and they do not work thereafter. Some 
of the agents, however, become temporarily unemployed after they work for a while, and then they go back to 
employment to retire at a later age. This pattern is mostly seen after period 5, because in the early periods, no 
matter how low wages they draw, they do not have the "luxury" not to work for a while since they have not yet 
accumulated assets to be substituted for labor income. As Table 2 shows, around 40% retire at period 8, 34% 
retire at period 7. 9.61% of them are temporarily unemployed at period 7, employed the next period, and then 
retire at period 9. The agents are all identical except that they may realize different wage and return shocks 
along their lives, and hence retire at different ages. In the finance literature studying household portfolio 
choices, it is always assumed that retirement age is fixed. As we can see in this model (and in the real data), it is 
not true. As will be made clear shortly, portfolio allocation decisions are sensitive to plans about retirement. If 
the agents' retirement patterns show such variability then a significant amount of variation in the household 
portfolios in data could be attributed to different retirement patterns. Hence assuming retirement age to be given 
may not be very appropriate. 
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Table 2: Timing of Retirement without Social Security 
Employment Sequence As a percentage of the population 
1111111000 39.69 
1111110000 33.63 
1111110100 9.61 
1111101000 5.61 
1111110010 2.25 
1111100000 2.22 
1111101100 2.05 
1111111100 1.25 
1111100100 1.25 
Other 2.44 
 
 
In Figure 1, we see that employment rate is 100% in the first 3 periods, and then it falls gradually to 
88% in period 6. Then we see a sharp decline: 50.3% in period 7, 14.6% in period 8, 3.6% in period 9, and 0.1% 
in period 10. 
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4.1.2. Consumption and Assets 
 
Consumption grows with age since the average rate of return on assets (between 1.03 and 1.04, 
depending on the portfolio composition) is higher than the rate of time preference (1.02). As a typical life-cycle 
model would suggest, the agents accumulate wealth while they are working and decumulate wealth during 
retirement. (See Figure 2) 
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4.1.3. Portfolio Allocation 
 
As we will see more clearly in the next section where solution results are presented, portfolio 
allocation depends on current cash-on-hand and expected future labor income. If cash-on-hand is very low, then 
the agents may prefer not to save, and we have no portfolio decision. If the agent decides to save, then there are 
a couple of ways the magnitude of cash-on-hand affects portfolio choice. As explained in Bodie, Merton, 
Samuelson (1991), total wealth can be thought of as the sum of human wealth and financial wealth. Human 
wealth is the expected total future labor income and financial wealth is the financial assets held. The relative 
magnitudes and risks of these two portions of wealth determine current portfolio choice.8 
 
 Figure 3 shows the evolution of the average percentage share of risky assets in total financial wealth. 
Portfolios are composed of 100% risky asset in the first 3 periods. Starting with the 4th period, we see a 
continuous decline until death. This is consistent with the well-known advice given by portfolio managers to 
individual investors: Hold a higher percentage of risky assets before retirement, and monotonically decrease the 
percentage of risky assets after retirement. The rationale behind that advice is the following: If the expected 
future labor income is relatively less risky compared to risky assets held, or if the correlation between future 
labor income shocks and return shocks is not significantly positive, then in the earlier stages of life total 
expected lifetime wealth has a big less risky component. As the agent approaches the end of the life cycle, 
expected labor income, that is, his less risky component of total expected financial wealth, shrinks. Hence the 
agents should hold riskier portfolios early in the life cycle and less risky portfolios towards the end of the life 
cycle. In the earlier periods of the life-cycle the agents can mitigate the effect of any big adverse return shock 
by dissipating its effect to longer future time periods (i.e. by working longer). On the other hand, in the later 
stages of life, there are not many periods left. 
 
                                                 
8For simplicity of interpretation I select the parameters in such a way that human wealth is "less risky" than financial wealth. 
We can easily obtain the results where wage offers are drawn from a distribution that has much bigger variance.  
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4.1.4. Behavior of Groups of Various Retirement Ages: 
 
I have picked the most populous groups in Table 2 and graphed their consumption, saving, income, 
and portfolio allocation paths. These groups are named as follows: 
 
Ret8: The group that consists of simulated agents who work for the first 7 periods, then retire at period 
8 and never return to work. This group constitutes around 40% of the population. 
 
Ret7: The group that consists of simulated agents who work for the first 6 periods, then retire at period 
7 and never return to work. This group constitutes around 34% of the population. 
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Ret7Back8: The group that consists of simulated agents who work for the first 6 periods, then 
temporarily retire at period 7, go back to work at period 8, and finally retire at period 9. This group constitutes 
around 10% of the population. 
 
In the Figures 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 below, I depict consumption, assets, income, return shocks, and portfolio 
allocation in order to demonstrate how identical agents exhibit different behaviors depending on the shocks 
(particularly on return shocks since I have kept the standard deviation of wages very small). 
 
In Figure 4, we see that consumption drops in the period where Ret7 agents retire. This is not because 
of a strong adverse shock (See Figure 7). These agents are lucky in the sense that they received big positive 
return shocks throughout the first 6 periods, and they were able to save more than the other groups (see Figure 
5). Having a lot of savings, realizing an above average return shock in period 7, and the desire not to work 
contributes to their decision that they would sacrifice some current consumption in order not to work thereafter. 
Almost the opposite scenario applies to Ret8 and Ret7Back8 so that they cannot afford to retire, and they have 
to work one more period. Once they decide to work, they have around 20 thousand dollars more, and hence we 
see a big increase in consumption. The difference between Ret8 and Ret7Back8 is that the latter group has a 
little more assets and they temporarily retire at period 7 only to receive a big adverse return shock in period 8 
and go back to employment. 
 
In Figure 8 we see that the Ret7Back8 group has a higher share of risky assets in their portfolio at 
period 6, and especially at period 7. Even though Ret7Back8 group has almost same amount of cash-on-hand as 
the Ret7 group, they decide to hold more risky financial wealth in period 7 compared to the Ret7 group. Why? 
That is because they are more likely to work in period 8 than the Ret7 group. They do not have enough assets 
saved to withstand a big adverse return shock in period 8. But it is worth putting a little bit more money on the 
risky asset with the hope that a good return will allow them to retire sooner (if they get a good return they would 
have been in the Ret7 group).  
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Figure 5
Average Wealth by Age
by Groups of Various Retirement Ages
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Figure 6
Average Incomes by Age
by Groups of Various Retirement Ages
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Figure 7
Average Returns on Risky Asset Holdings by Age
by Groups of Various Retirement Ages
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Figure 8
Average Portfolio Allocation by Age
by Groups of Various Retirement Ages
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4.2.    Simulations with Social Security 
 
I use the same parameters as simulation 1 other than the social insurance parameters. I used the 
following benefit schedule:9  
 
t\e 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 0          
2 0 0         
3 0 0 0        
4 0 0 0 0       
5 0 0 0 0 0      
6 0 0 0 0 0 0     
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 5    
8 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 10   
9 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 10 12  
10 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 10 12 15 
 
 
Table 3: Timing of Retirement with Social Security 
Employment Sequence Percent 
1111111000 9.54 
1111110000 90.10 
1111110100 0.36 
 
Table 3 shows that employment patterns are more regular with Social Security because of the 
incentives to retire at certain times provided by the system. Around 90% of the agents retire at period 7, when 
they are eligible for a relatively small early retirement benefit. 
 
Figure 9 shows average consumption and saving paths. We see that this social insurance program 
depresses savings, and average consumption in the Social Security case is higher by about $1,000 at every point 
in time compared to the one with no Social Security. 
 
                                                 
9
 Note that this is not an actuarially fair system since the agents become eligible for benefit even though they do not 
contribute at all. 
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Figure 10 shows that until period 8, optimal portfolios are more risky without the social insurance 
system. One factor contributing to this should be that for 90% of the simulated agents future income in the 
simulation with Social Security is 5 for every period after 6, and that is small relative to assets held. Hence the 
inherent risk in total wealth is bigger in simulations with Social Security, and thus less risky portfolios are 
optimal. In the last 2 periods optimal portfolios in the SS case are a little more risky than the ones in no SS case. 
That could be because there is almost no chance to be working in the last 2 periods in no SS case. Hence there is 
less non-risky human wealth remained in no SS case compared to SS case. Thus agents may be holding less 
risky portfolios in no SS case compared to SS case.  
Figure 9
Average Consumption and Assets by Age 
with and without Social Security
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Figure 10
Average Portfolio Allocation by Age
with and without Social Security
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5.    Analyzing the Solution in More Detail 
 
 Analyzing the solution of the model we can get a more detailed idea about how the model works. In 
the literature, generally simulations are presented but examining the solution patterns gives the most detailed 
information on the model dynamics. 
 
The following 3 graphs depict how the solution (optimal consumption and portfolio allocation) 
changes with respect to cash-on-hand in the last three periods (period 9, 8, and 7 respectively). For period 9, I 
also show the value function to point out its non-concavity. 
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    Figure 11 
 
 
    Figure 12 
 
   
 
31
    
Figure 13 
 
Figure 14 
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When we examine the graphs we make the following observations: 
 
1) Consumption: There are abrupt consumption drops. The number of consumption drops is equal to 
the number of periods left. 
 
2) Portfolio Allocation: There is a general downward trend, and there are some spikes in between. The 
number of spikes is same as the number of periods left. 
 
I will show that the reason behind the jumps in the portfolio allocation and consumption is the 
"sudden"10 changes in expected future income.11 
  
The following two factors have important roles in the sudden big drops in consumption: 1) The strong 
desire not to work: Individuals either work or don’t work. Once they decide to work, they face a big negative 
utility loss due to the additive marginal disutility of work component of the utility function. 2) The utility 
function, which is very steep at low levels of consumption and flat at higher levels of consumption. So, 
although the benefit of working (through increased income) can be very low at relatively higher levels of 
consumption, the utility cost of working may be very high, which does not depend on consumption level. 
Hence, the agents are willing to forego a big chunk of consumption today in order to afford not to work next 
period. 
 
To illustrate that reasoning let us consider Figure 12 and trace optimal consumption relative to cash-
on-hand. For small values of cash-on-hand (up until about $19,500) the agent does not save at all. He consumes 
everything. That is because the cash-on-hand he has is too small to maintain minimal consumption levels in 
period 9 and period 10. Since the utility function is very steep at those relatively small levels of consumption, 
                                                 
10The word "sudden" is used in the sense that for a small change in cash-on-hand, we may see abrupt changes in optimal 
consumption and portfolio allocation. 
 
11We will see that the sudden changes in portfolio allocation and also in consumption happen at the points where the 
probability of future employment dramatically changes. The graphs of probabilities of future employment are provided in 
the upcoming pages. 
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he realizes that he will have to work next period: The penalty for not working next period (that is, getting very 
low levels of utility from consumption in this and the future period) is even worse than the stiff utility penalty 
for working next period. Since he knows he will be working next period, there is no need to save now. Enjoy 
consumption today, and tomorrow's consumption will be completely financed by tomorrow's labor income. 
If we keep increasing cash-on-hand, at some point the agent will have enough cash-on-hand to afford not to 
work next period. At that point savings has to jump from 0 to a not-so-small positive number since, due to the 
shape of the utility function, miniscule levels of next period consumption cannot be optimal. 
 
To help understand the patterns in portfolio allocation solutions consider the following two possible 
cases: 
 
Case 1: Corner Solution. Financial wealth can be a very small fraction of total wealth (especially in 
early periods). Then the total wealth is dominated by human wealth. If future labor earnings are not very risky, 
then the overall riskiness of total wealth may be too low and the agents may find it optimal to invest all their 
financial wealth in the risky asset. 
 
Case 2: If the share of financial wealth in total wealth gets bigger, and we keep everything else equal, 
then we would expect a smaller percentage of risky assets held compared to the previous case.  
 
If we examine the solutions carefully, we can see these two effects in play both within a period and 
across periods. 
 
Within a given period, changing cash-on-hand changes the share of financial wealth in total wealth. 
For the moment let's focus on each smooth part of the portfolio allocation that are between the spikes 
separately. All of them are smoothly declining. Explanation: If the expected future employment sequence is 
roughly constant, then increasing cash-on-hand (hence increasing the more risky component of wealth, financial 
wealth) should lead the agent to decrease the share of risky assets in his portfolio. 
 
   
 
34
Now notice that the lowest point of each smooth part (in between the spikes) is lower than its 
counterparts, which are to the left. Explanation: The magnitude of cash-on-hand determines the probabilities of 
expected future employment sequences. If we keep increasing cash-on-hand, at some point, the forward looking 
agent will realize that he may have enough cash-on-hand to retire one period early. At this point we may 
observe a fast change of probabilities of future employment sequences. Portfolio allocation responds to this 
change of future employment probabilities: If it is likely now that the agent is going to work for one less period, 
then he has to hold a less risky portfolio since the share of risky wealth in total wealth has grown.  
 
Across periods: The same level of cash-on-hand implies different portfolio allocations in different 
periods simply because the composition of the total changes over time. 
 
Now it is time for the spikes: Above, I have described some of the main channels through which 
portfolio allocation is affected. The results that we see are far richer than that. The interaction between the 
magnitude of cash-on-hand and probabilities of future employment creates possibilities for optimal portfolio 
allocation to vary a lot. For example in addition to the cases described above, think of the "gray" areas where 
the agent has such an amount of cash-on-hand such that he is neither very likely to work nor very unlikely to 
work in a future period. In those cases the agent may gamble now for a chance to avoid working next period. He 
may prefer to hold a riskier financial portfolio hoping that, next period, he may get returns high enough that he 
will not have to work. If he is lucky he will get a huge utility boost. If not, he may not "suffer" too much in the 
sense that it was already probable that he would work next period, and now he will have more cash-on-hand 
(because of the labor income) to be spent on consumption. 
 
In the light of the explanations above, now let's reexamine the portfolio allocation decisions by looking 
at the above 3 figures: Portfolio allocation (x) versus cash-on-hand in period 9, period 8, and then 7: 
 
In period 9, x is constant just the way it is in the simplest form of dynamic portfolio choice model of 
Samuelson. With the constant relative risk aversion utility function, a fixed proportion of wealth is invested in 
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the risky asset. Our model is more general than his, but period 9 is a special case since the future horizon is only 
1 period and the agents are certain that they are not going to work if they decide to save. 
 
Note that for all periods the number of consumption drops is same as the number of periods left. That 
is not a coincidence. At those points where consumption drops abruptly, probabilities of future employment 
change abruptly too. Once the agent thinks that saving more aggressively allows him to retire one period earlier, 
he is willing to take a big consumption drop. This is very clear in period 9 since only 1 period is ahead. But, the 
earlier periods we analyze are more complicated since there is now interaction between possible future 
employment sequences. 
 
In periods 8 and 7 we see two things: The optimal share of risky assets is a monotonic decreasing 
function of cash-on-hand, and the optimal share suddenly jumps to a higher value two times in period 8 and 3 
times in period 7. Again, this is because of the way the probabilities of future employment sequences change. 
Consider period 8: For small values of cash-on-hand agents do not save. For a little higher value agents save 
and plan to work for the next 2 periods. If they have a little more cash-on-hand they may plan to work for 1 
period less, and finally if they have a huge amount of savings they figure they will never work. These are where 
we see the jumps in x. 
 
To see whether the jump in consumption is the result of using a "not fine enough" grid, I solve the 
model with 10 times more grid points for cash-on-hand, that is I use 2,000 grid points rather than 200. We still 
see the jumps in consumption and portfolio choice. 
 
To better understand the reason behind the jump, I calculate and report the probability of next period 
employment at period 9. I report this for period 9 because at this period there are only two possible future 
employment patterns: work and not work. If I were to use previous periods, then the number of possible future 
employment patterns increase exponentially. As I have explained previously, the reason of the jump is the 
"sudden" big changes in the probability of next period employment. I report the relationship between the 
probability of next period employment and current cash-on-hand. Note that the probability is endogenous in that 
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it is calculated after the agents optimally choose consumption and portfolio allocation given cash-on-hand. We 
will see below that as cash-on-hand increases, at some point the probability jumps down from 100% to 0%. To 
help visualize how that probability jumps, I also present the relationship between the probability of next period 
employment and consumption-portfolio allocation pairs at a given cash-on-hand. There we will see, in some 
regions, how extremely sensitive that probability is to changes in either consumption or portfolio choice. 
 
The way I calculate the probabilities is simple: Due to the nature of dynamic programming, we already 
had to take into account every possible future event in calculating optimal decisions. I just modified the 
program to keep track of whether the agent works or not in every case. Then I simply calculate the ratio of the 
number of cases in which the agent works to the number of total cases. The number of total cases is 10,000 
since it is the number of draws I use in Monte Carlo integrations. 
 
 
    Figure 15 
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 Figure 16 
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Figure 17 
 
 
Note that the probability of next period employment is very sensitive to both consumption and 
portfolio allocation in the region where consumption is around 11 and 12. We see abrupt changes in the 
probability of future work even if the change in consumption or portfolio allocation is very small. In the most 
sensitive part of the grid, (where consumption takes the values 12.30 and 12.34, and portfolio allocation takes 
the values 0%, 1%, and 2%) here are the magnitudes of the sensitivities: 
 
Sensitivity to Consumption: 
 
At x = 0, a tiny increase in consumption from 12.30 to 12.34 causes the probability of next-period 
employment to jump from 0% to 82.53%.  
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Sensitivity to Portfolio Allocation: 
 
At C = 12.30, 1% point increase in X from 1% to 2% causes the probability of next period employment 
to increase by 12.07% points from 2.48% to 14.55%. 
 
At C = 12.34, 1% point increase in X from 0% to 1% causes the probability of next period employment 
to decrease by 18.62% points from 82.53% to 63.91%. 
 
A case where we do not see any "jumps" neither in consumption nor in portfolio allocation policy rules 
is when labor supply is not a choice (retirement age is fixed): 
 
What happens when retirement age is treated as given? 
 
I also solved the model with the disutility of employment equal to 0. Then all agents worked for all the 
periods of course. As can be seen in Figure 18, we do not see any of these jumps in optimal portfolio 
allocations12 because the plan of future employment does not depend on the magnitude of cash-on-hand: Agents 
always work. Two important patterns in Figure 18 should be explained here: 
 
Pattern 1: We still see the monotonically decreasing portfolio allocation with cash-on-hand. 
Pattern 2: As agent ages, he holds less and less risky financial portfolios at each level of cash-on-hand. That is, 
X9 lies below X5, X5 lies below X4, and X4 lies below X2. 
  
In order to understand those patterns, we should keep in mind that expected future labor income is a 
risky asset that is held implicitly. That asset may serve as a substitute for the risky or the riskfree financial asset.  
 
                                                 
12Even though I do not present a figure for consumption here, we do not see any jumps in optimal consumption either. 
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Explanation of pattern 1: More cash-on-hand means a higher share of financial wealth and thus a lower 
share of human wealth in total wealth. As the share of human wealth decreases, the share of riskfree financial 
wealth increases. Hence, expected future labor income stream and riskfree financial asset serve as substitutes 
for each other.  
 
Explanation of pattern 2: As agent gets older, the share of his human wealth in total wealth naturally 
decreases. As the share of human wealth decreases (due to aging), he holds a higher share of riskfree financial 
wealth at each level of cash-on-hand. Again, this is consistent with the intuition that expected future labor 
income stream and riskfree financial asset serve as substitutes for each other. 
 
Cocco, Gomes, Maenhout (2001) reports the same patterns. Observing the same patterns as theirs is 
not a surprise because the assumption of no disutility of employment in my model corresponds to their 
assumptions that the agents work until they retire and the retirement age is fixed. They also show that these 
patterns prevail when the correlation between labor income risk and stock market risk has a small positive 
value.13   
                                                 
13The correlation is set to 0 in the solutions presented throughout my study. 
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   Figure 18 
 
 
 
In summary the theoretical model presented here implies that as agents age they should choose less 
risky financial portfolios. This result is consistent with the recent literature on household portfolios. The 
innovation in the model is the treatment of labor supply as a dichotomous choice variable. In the household 
portfolio literature it was always treated as given. I show that introducing labor supply as a choice variable 
changes decision rules. We may see big "jumps" in the consumption and portfolio allocation decision rules for a 
given set of model parameters. One other innovation in the model is the presence of a social insurance program. 
The simulations show that the presence and generosity of social insurance programs may greatly alter 
household portfolio choice. In their working years, households hold much less risky financial portfolio in the 
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presence of Social Security than the absence of Social Security. The opposite result holds when the households 
are retired.14 
 
 
6.    Conclusion 
 
In this study, I analyze the interrelationships among retirement, saving, and asset allocation.  
I demonstrate that optimal portfolio allocation can be very sensitive to plans about retirement timing and to the 
presence and the characteristics of Social Security. I also show that portfolio decisions have impact on when to 
retire. Social Security reform proposals - especially the ones that include individual accounts - should be 
evaluated with models that incorporate portfolio choice. We would want to predict how individuals’ portfolios 
would change after the reform, so that we would have a better idea of the returns they would experience on their 
wealth. In return, we would predict more accurately how their wealth would evolve and when they would retire.   
                                                 
14Without doubt, this result depends on model parameters. However, the important point here is to demonstrate how Social 
Security can influence portfolio allocations. 
CHAPTER II 
  
Asset Allocation, Bequests, and Wealth Dynamics of the Elderly 
  
  44 
1. Introduction 
 
There has been growing interest among economists and policy makers in the saving and portfolio allocation 
behavior of older individuals. As the aging U.S. population threatens the financial solvency of the Social 
Security system, policy makers have been considering reducing benefits and adding individual accounts. 
However, two key issues arise: First, with lower Social Security benefits and the recent decline in private 
pension coverage, older individuals will be more dependent on their personal savings. But the household saving 
rate is very low in the U.S., and it is not clear how saving behavior will respond to changes in Social Security 
and pensions. Second, individuals will have to make investment decisions as they take control of their 
retirement assets. Many individuals have little experience with portfolio allocation, and there is considerable 
concern that poor investment decisions could eliminate the potential advantage of increased individual savings. 
Moreover, a sizable fraction of retirees do not hold any stocks. If this behavior is an indication of how they 
would allocate the assets in their Social Security individual retirement accounts, then the benefits from having 
access to high stock returns will be limited. The interest in how older individuals manage their assets is also 
spurred by macroeconomic considerations. Older individuals hold an increasingly larger share of the U.S. 
financial wealth. Thus, how wealth and its composition change with age in the last stage of life has important 
implications for asset prices in the near future when the baby boom generation retires and then reaches the end 
of life the cycle. A particular concern is the possibility of an "asset meltdown" - whether the baby boomers will 
liquidate their sizable assets to finance consumption during retirement, thus causing a plunge in asset prices.1 I 
develop and estimate a life cycle model of asset allocation, bequests, and saving in order to understand these 
complex behaviors and how they interact with each other, and to find the implications for the important issues 
stated above.  
 
Life cycle models provide an ideal framework to address these issues. Economics of aging and finance 
are two broad strands of literature that have successfully used the life cycle framework to provide an explicit 
structure that reflects the complex and uncertain environments individuals face in making important decisions 
that have future consequences. This framework naturally captures the important dynamic link between current 
                                                 
1See Poterba, 2004 for a review and analysis of this issue. 
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and future behavior. In the economics of aging literature, life cycle models have been estimated structurally to 
analyze important decisions such as wealth and bequests of the elderly (Hurd, 1989), wealth of the elderly in the 
presence of medical expenditure uncertainty (Palumbo, 1999), pre-retirement consumption (Gourinchas and 
Parker, 2002), retirement (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1986), Rust and Phelan, 1997), and retirement and saving 
(French, 2005; and van der Klaauw and Wolpin, 2005).2 However, this literature has not yet explored asset 
allocation behavior and its relation to saving in a structural framework. On the other hand, in the finance 
literature, there has been an extensive amount of work on portfolio choice, since portfolio choice generates the 
demand side of one of the fundamental topics in finance: asset pricing. However, they do not focus on the 
savings behavior of the elderly, and their method of choice for finding the key behavioral parameters is fixing 
them (i.e., calibration) instead of estimating them. 3  I combine these two approaches from economics and 
finance by estimating the behavioral parameters of a joint model of saving and asset allocation. 
 
Specifically, I extend the seminal work of Hurd (1989) on saving behavior of the elderly by 
generalizing his life cycle model to include an asset allocation decision, stochastic asset returns, a fixed stock 
market entry cost, medical expenditure risk, and a more general bequest function. This is the first study to 
estimate a life cycle model of asset allocation and savings using longitudinal micro data by explicitly solving a 
stochastic dynamic programming model for the elderly. 
 
A stock market entry cost is included in the model to capture the fact that a significant fraction of the 
elderly do not hold stocks in the U.S. Even though U.S. household stock market participation has steadily 
increased, about half of the households still do not own stocks (Ameriks and Zeldes, 2004). The non-
participation rate is even higher for the elderly. 73% of the elderly sample I use for this study do not own stocks. 
This empirical fact is commonly rationalized by monetary and other costs of holding stocks. One must spend 
time to gather information about the stock market, and pay a brokerage fee to set up an account.4 Inadequate 
understanding of the financial system, distrust in the institutions facilitating transactions, and excess worrying 
                                                 
2This is only a partial list of related literature. 
 
3Gomes and Michaelides (2005) is a recent example among many others. 
4See Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) for how different types of costs might affect the stock market participation decision. 
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about the possibility that lifetime savings could evaporate are some of the other possible explanations for the 
reluctance of even the wealthy to hold stocks.5 I estimate a dollar denominated stock market entry cost within 
this framework for the first time in the literature.6 
 
There has been growing evidence that the elderly might not intend to completely deplete their wealth 
by the time they die.7 In my sample, individuals who were 90 years or older in 1995 spent down only 6.2% of 
their 1995 net worth by 2002. There are a few potential explanations for this phenomenon: First, there is a 
significant out-of-pocket medical expenditure risk that increases with age. Retirees may be holding on to wealth 
in case they need it for their medical problems. Second, the presence of a strong bequest motive may also cause 
the elderly to keep their wealth. A simple linear bequest function has been successfully used to match wealth 
profiles in models of saving. However, this relatively simple bequest function is too restrictive when one is 
interested in analyzing portfolio choice. This is a result of the implicit assumption built into a linear bequest 
function that individuals are risk neutral with respect to their bequests. This implies that if the individual’s 
saving decision is mainly driven by a strong bequest motive, then she should be aggressively investing in risky 
assets. This is not what the data show. To overcome that limitation, I specify a general bequest function similar 
to the one suggested by Carroll (2000), with an additional behavioral parameter, capturing attitudes towards 
bequest risk. Estimating such a general bequest function is one of the original contributions of this work. A third 
possible explanation for the slow observed rate of wealth decumulation is the run-up in the stock market (for 
example in the 1990’s). The studies analyzing data sets from these periods suffer from not taking into account 
the actual returns each individual earns. These returns depend on the individual’s portfolio choices and one 
needs to model this choice in order to measure asset returns accurately. In this study, I incorporate all  three 
explanations within a structural framework. Thus, I will be able to identify the effect of each of these factors. 
 
                                                 
5The non-economic factors thought to influence the decision to own stocks are usually named "psychic" costs. See Curcuru, 
Heaton, Lucas, and Moore (2004) for the current state of the finance literature in explaining the large heterogeneity in 
observed portfolio choice. 
 
6Alan (2005) also estimates this fixed cost, but she only fits stock market participation profiles whereas I fit wealth and asset 
allocation profiles. 
 
7See Kopczuk and Lupton (in press) for evidence of a bequest motive in the same data set that I use. 
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The estimation result indicate that the bequest motive is economically almost nonexistent. The 
estimated model fits the asset and portfolio allocation data reasonably well, both in sample and out of sample. 
The model explains both the observed average age profiles and the heterogeneity in saving and portfolio 
allocation. Furthermore, the model explains the apparently puzzling portfolio allocation behavior of the elderly: 
only a minority of the elderly with a significant amount of wealth hold stocks, and of those who do hold stocks, 
the share of stocks in the portfolio is relatively small. The model captures these patterns with very large 
estimates for the stock market fixed entry cost and the degree of risk aversion. 
 
I use the estimates of the behavioral parameters to simulate the impact of a reform of Social Security to 
include individual accounts. What would happen if the Social Security benefit of a 70-year old retiree was cut 
by a given amount and she was given a lump sum equal to the expected present discounted value of the benefit 
cut? Will she be better off, since she can invest it in assets that have high average returns? The answer provided 
by the model is an unequivocal no. This answer does not depend on whether a private annuity market is 
available to the retirees that could be used to undo the reform. I find that the typical retiree would be willing to 
pay about 10% of her wealth at age 70 to avoid this change if she does not have access to the annuity market. 
Put differently, to keep her welfare constant the government would need to pay 16% more than the actuarially 
fair amount in converting the benefit cut into a lump sum. Furthermore, the less well-to-do retirees are predicted 
to be hurt more than the well-to-do retirees. Having access to the annuity market makes retirees slightly better 
off, but not enough to make the reform desirable, due to the actuarially very unfair pricing of annuities. The 
model predicts that this reform is welfare reducing because the flow of financial resources provided by the risk-
free Social Security lifetime annuity cannot be easily matched by the returns on the lump sum payment when 
the date of death is uncertain. This is especially true for retirees who do not have a private pension to 
supplement Social Security benefit payments. 
 
The paper has 6 remaining sections. Section 2 details the theoretical model of saving and asset 
allocation and how I solve it. Section 3 discusses the implications of the model for retiree behavior. Section 4 
describes the data on the elderly that are used for estimating the model. Section 5 explains the empirical model. 
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The results, the fit of the model, and the policy simulations are presented in Section 6. Section 7 concludes with 
the limitations and the planned extensions for future work. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
Consider an unmarried individual who is and will be out of the labor force until death. Her only source of 
income is from public and private pension benefits and annuities. 8 Suppose her income is constant in real terms. 
Age of death is uncertain: The probability of dying at age t conditional on being alive until age t is mt. Each 
year, she faces a random out-of-pocket medical expense. The  distribution of this expense is age-dependent and 
is estimated from the data. This expense is deducted from her available cash-on-hand. Each year, she decides 
how much to consume, Ct, and whether to pay the stock market entry cost if she hasn't already paid it. If she has 
paid the entry cost before or if she decides to pay it now, she also chooses the fraction of her wealth allocated to 
risky assets, xt. Otherwise, all of her wealth is kept in a risk-free asset. She is not allowed to borrow or sell 
either of her assets short: xt ∈ [0,1]. She derives utility from consumption and the amount of wealth held at 
death, which is bequeathed to her heirs. At each age, the retiree makes these decisions so as to maximize the 
EPDV of remaining lifetime utility.  
 
 
2.1. For Retirees Who Have Already Paid the Entry Cost 
 
For a retiree who has already paid the stock market entry cost, the value function at age t, given non-
asset income I, and wealth Wt is 
 
                                                 
8I have made two assumptions about income from pensions and annuities that contributed significantly to the feasibility of 
estimating the model: They continue to be paid until the respondent dies, and they are constant in real terms (that is, cost-of-
living adjusted). These assumptions are true for payments from Social Security, but not for some types of pensions and 
annuities. 
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She maximizes this value function subject to 
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where u is the consumption utility function, b is the bequest function, δ is the discount factor, W*t is the end-of-
period wealth, which is equal to tt CCOH −  , and Rt+1 is the total return on period t end-of-year wealth that is 
realized at the beginning of period t+1. 
 
Cash-on-hand, ttt MIWCOH −+=  is the total net resources available for consumption or saving in 
period t. Once consumption is made, end-of-period wealth, Wt* = COHt - Ct  is invested in a risky and risk-free 
asset. The return on Wt* is: 
 
)1()1)(1(1 1++++−=+ trtxrtxtR . 
 
r and rt+1  are the rates of return for the riskless and the risky assets, respectively. Note that Rt+1 is stochastic 
since rt  is stochastic. Further note that the amount of the bequest in the event of death is uncertain because it 
depends on the return realized at the beginning of period t+1, rt+1. Mt+1 is the out-of-pocket medical expenditure, 
which is realized at the beginning of period t+1. 
 
C is the minimum consumption level guaranteed by the government. Individuals with low income may 
find it optimal not to save if they are likely to utilize asset-tested government transfers (Hubbard, Skinner and 
Zeldes, 1994). A simple way of modeling this is to include a minimum guaranteed consumption level 
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(consumption floor), C . I assume that consumption never falls below C . Whenever cash-on-hand falls below 
C , the government transfers cash to the individual in order to increase cash-on-hand to C , and requires the 
individual to spend all of his assets. 
 
 
2.2. For Retirees Who Have Not Paid the Entry Cost 
 
We can think of this optimization problem in two steps: In the first step, the retiree computes the optimal plan 
for each of the two possible choices: pay and do not pay the entry cost. In step two, she chooses the one that 
gives her the higher lifetime utility. 
 
Step 1: Since the returns are not stochastic in this case, the value function if she chooses not to pay the entry 
cost is: 
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subject to 11 )1)(( ++ −+−+= tttt MrCIWW  and CCt ≥ .  ),( 11 IWV tt ++  is defined below. 
 
The value function if she chooses to pay the fixed entry cost, FEC is: 
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where paidtV  was specified above. 
 
Step 2: The value function for this individual is the maximum of these two choice-specific value functions: 
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2.3. Preferences and Asset Returns 
 
The utility from consumption in period t is  
γ
γ
−
=
−
1
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cu , where u is a constant-relative-risk-aversion 
(CRRA) function and γ measures the degree of risk aversion towards consumption. Expected utility derived 
during period t from wealth held at the beginning of t+1 if the individual dies at the end of t 
is: ]
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+ , where Wt+1 is next period wealth, γb measures the degree of risk aversion 
towards bequests, and α is a parameter that measures the strength of the bequest motive. Note that we do not 
exclude the possibility that risk aversion may differ for bequests and consumption. For example, individuals 
may be more worried about the volatility in their own future consumption than about volatility in the amount of 
wealth they bequeath. In this case, γ > γb. This will also imply that wealthier individuals have higher saving 
rates and a higher share of risky assets in their portfolios (Carroll 2000).  
 
The risk-free asset has a fixed rate of return, r . The risky asset return is independently and identically 
distributed through time. I approximate the real annual return of U.S. equities by a discrete distribution with 
three points of support using real S&P500 splits/dividends adjusted historical series. r can take the values r1, r2, 
and r3 with probabilities p1, p2, and 1-p1-p2, respectively.9 
 
 
 
                                                 
9r1=0.315, r2=0.04, r3=-0.26, p1=0.35, p2=0.45, p3=0.20. r  has 7.625% mean and 20.77% standard deviation. 
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2.4. Out-of-Pocket Medical Expenditure 
 
We have data on total out-of-pocket medical expenses (OMX) within the past 2 years of each interview date. 
Assume that these two years correspond to ages t and t+1. I define OMXt = OMXt+1 to be half of what the 
reported total is. A categorical variable is defined such that the value 1 corresponds to a low expense, value 2 
corresponds to a medium expense, and value 3 corresponds to a high expense. The cut-off points are $1,000 and 
$11,000. A multinomial logit of this variable is regressed on age. Then, probabilities of belonging in categories 
are predicted using the estimated parameters. Separate least squares regressions of level of expenses are run for 
each category. Mean level of expenses for each category is predicted using the OLS parameters. See Tables 12 
and 13 in the Appendix for the estimated probabilities and levels of medical expenses. 
 
 
2.5. Solution Method 
 
The model does not have an analytic solution. It is solved numerically by backward recursion from the last 
period to the first.10 Step 1: In the last period, the probability of surviving to the next period is zero and hence, 
given the annuity income stream and beginning-of-period wealth, the individual's problem simplifies to: 
[ ]}{ )()(max
,
1         ++ TTT WbEcu
xc TT
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Given that the return distribution has been discretized, we can write 
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+  where ri is the i
th
 possible value of the asset return and 
pi is the probability of this realization. Wealth and annuity income are continuous variables and hence it is not 
                                                 
10I outline the solution method for a retiree who has paid the stock market entry cost. The method extends to the other case 
easily. 
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feasible to solve this equation for every possible beginning-of-period wealth and annuity. Instead, I solve the 
model for a two dimensional grid of wealth and income values.11 Step 2: Solve Equation 1 for t = T-1. The 
expected value of the next period value function is calculated by integrating over the return distribution, as 
illustrated above for the terminal period. We have already calculated the next-period value function on a grid of 
wealth and income in step 1. The off-grid values of the next-period value function are calculated by linear 
interpolation. This procedure is repeated until the period-1 equation is solved. I use a two-dimensional grid 
search algorithm to find consumption and the share of risky assets at each step. 
 
 
3. Implications of the Model for Asset Allocation and Saving Behavior of 
Retirees12,13 
 
To see the behavioral implications of the model, I simulate its solution for a 70-year old female who has already 
paid the stock market entry fee and has $200,000 net wealth and a $15,000 real annuity. The simulated solutions 
are calculated by solving the model 10,000 times – each for a random draw from the return distribution at each 
age – and averaging over these solutions. Simulated wealth and stock shares without and with bequests are 
depicted in Figures 19 and 20, respectively, for specific values of the behavioral parameters described below. 
The discount factor is 0.98, the risk-free asset has 2% mean real return, and the stock market has the return 
distribution that was described in the previous section. 
 
Figure 19 shows the optimal wealth (left panel) and the stock share (right panel) trajectories at low (γ = 
0.5), moderate (γ = 4.0), and high (γ = 15.0) levels of risk aversion for the above retiree who does not have a 
bequest motive. There are some notable patterns in this figure. On the left panel, the absence of a bequest 
motive manifests itself with wealth being completely depleted before death. Also, greater risk aversion leads to 
slower wealth decumulation (see Hurd, 1989). On the right panel, we see that the share of risky assets is 
                                                 
11During estimation, I use 500 grid points for beginning-of-period wealth and 6 grid points for annuity income. 
 
12Throughout this section, I assume there is no medical expense risk to better focus on the effect of a bequest motive. Later, 
I will include the cases when there is medical expense risk. 
 
13Throughout this section, I assume that there is no medical expenditure risk. This allows me discuss the effects of a bequest 
motive on behavior in isolation from other factors that might also induce saving (ie, medical expenditure risk). 
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inversely related to the degree of risk aversion. This ordering is directly implied by the definition of risk 
aversion. More risk averse individuals keep lower shares of stocks at every age than do less risk averse 
individuals. An important thing to note is that low to moderate risk aversion levels imply stock shares that are 
much higher than what we observe in the data. In the elderly sample I use for this study, most stockholders hold 
little stocks and the mean share of stocks is about 1/3 among stock holders. These observations imply that only 
high risk aversion can possibly explain the data within this framework. 
 
A striking observation in the right panel of Figure 19 is that no matter how risk averse an individual is, 
the optimal share of risky assets increases as she ages (except for the low risk aversion, γ = 0.5, where the 
solution is on the boundary). This result is in stark contrast to advice from many financial planners, which is 
that people should hold about (100-Age) percent of their wealth in stocks (Malkiel, 1996). This seemingly 
counterintuitive pattern needs explanation. 14  A retiree's financial resources consist of wealth and income. 
Wealth can be spent or accumulated and can be held in risky or risk free assets. However, income of retirees is 
fixed and risk free since it is a real annuity. Portfolio rebalancing as the retiree ages can only be done by 
adjusting wealth. Consider a particular portfolio configuration and wealth at a given age, t. At age t+1, the 
retiree will spend some of her wealth since there is by assumption no bequest motive in the model used to 
generate Figure 19. Thus, total resources decline but the risk-free source (income) does not change. The 
portfolio is rebalanced by putting a greater share of wealth in the risky asset to keep the risk exposure level at 
the optimal level. Kahvecioglu and Hurd (2005) show that the reason financial planners’ advice is different than 
optimal behavior found here is that financial planners do not take into account the significant decline in wealth 
after retirement.15 As a matter of fact, Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) find evidence that individuals do not decrease 
their stock shares as they age. There is also evidence in the AHEAD sample I use for this study (as will be seen 
in the section on data) that stock shares increase slightly with age, which would be consistent with the model 
presented here. Introducing bequests may change this conclusion as discussed later in this section. 
 
                                                 
14See Kahvecioglu and Hurd (2005) for more on this. 
 
15They show that, if optimal wealth were constant until death, the optimal percentage of wealth held in stocks would roughly 
be in agreement with the financial planners’ advice. 
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Introducing a bequest motive will make the wealth profiles flatter (Hurd, 1989). 16 The wealth profile 
for γ = 4 in Figure 19 flattens in Figure 20 on the left panel after including a bequest function. The dotted and 
long-dashed lines correspond to bequest functions that are linear and exhibit the same degree of risk aversion as 
the consumption-utility function, respectively. The dashed line is for a bequest function that exhibits risk 
aversion that is in between the other two. Notice how similar the three wealth profiles, in the presence of 
bequests, are for most of the remaining life. This is not a coincidence: I picked those three bequest parameter 
pairs (γb and α) deliberately so as to produce similar wealth profiles. Even the simple linear bequest function 
(the dotted line) can produce the same profile. As a matter of fact, the linear bequest function has been 
successfully used in the savings literature to help match the wealth data. However, if we wish to match both 
asset allocation and wealth data, we will need a bequest function with at least two parameters, one for risk 
aversion, (γb) and one for strength (α), as I will show later in this section. Even though I do not demonstrate it 
here, it is worth mentioning that the way I model bequests implies that wealthy individuals are more likely to 
have operative bequest motives if risk aversion for bequests is lower than risk aversion for consumption. Then, 
bequests become luxury goods and the wealthy individual invests a higher fraction of her wealth in the risky 
asset and her saving rate will be higher (see Carroll (2000)). However, note that, in estimating the model, I will 
allow the possibility that risk aversion for bequests could be equal to or higher than risk aversion for 
consumption. Even though there is a recent surge of articles on life cycle portfolios, none to my knowledge has 
allowed this level of generality in risk aversion toward bequests. They usually use bequest functions that have 
the same risk aversion parameter value as the consumption-utility function (Cocco, Gomes, and Maenhout 
(2005) is a recent example). Given that the wealthy are thought to have an operative bequest motive, and thus a 
significant fraction of wealth is held to be bequeathed, it is worth freeing up the parameter that governs the risk 
aversion toward bequests in order to better understand the demand for stocks. As a matter of fact, I show below 
that this in fact seems necessary in order to understand the joint saving and portfolio behavior of the elderly. 
 
There are two major channels through which the bequest motive affects the optimal portfolio allocation 
path. The first channel is risk aversion toward bequests. If an agent is less risk averse for bequests than she is 
for consumption, and if she wishes to bequeath some fraction of her wealth, then she will be willing to expose 
                                                 
16Even an increasing wealth profile is possible if the bequest motive is strong enough. 
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more of her wealth to risk than she would without a bequest motive. Furthermore, as she ages and the risk of 
death increases, utility from bequests will be discounted less. As the strength of the bequest motive relative to 
utility from consumption increases, there will be upward pressure on the riskiness of the portfolio. Consider the 
extreme case in which the agent is risk neutral toward bequests (γB = 0) but risk averse toward consumption (γB 
> 0). In the last period of her life, she would invest 100% of her end-of-period wealth in the risky asset (see 
Figure 20). The second channel is an indirect one whereby the optimal portfolio allocation is affected through 
the change in the wealth profile caused by the bequest motive. In the presence of annuity income, an increase in 
wealth holdings due to a bequest motive will lead to shifting of the portfolio toward the risk free asset.17 Thus a 
bequest motive has an ambiguous net effect on asset allocation. The net effect depends on age, wealth, income, 
and preferences. 
 
On the right panel of Figure 20, the values of the parameter for the strength of the bequest motive, α, is 
chosen so that the implied wealth profiles are very similar. This allows us to isolate the first major channel 
mentioned above through which the bequest motive affects the portfolio allocation path: risk aversion toward 
bequests. Risk aversion toward consumption (γ) is set at 4. Three levels of risk aversion toward bequests are 
depicted: no risk aversion (γb = 0, linear bequest function), the same risk aversion as for consumption (γb = 4), 
and a risk aversion in between (γb = 2). It is useful to remember that in the no-bequest case (solid line), the 
optimal share of stocks increases with age since wealth - which is the risky portion of total financial resources 
whereas the risk-free portion is income - decreases. It will be very informative to compare the three bequest 
functions that differ by risk aversion, to the case of no bequests: First, in the presence of a linear bequest motive 
(dotted line, risk neutrality), the optimal stock share is even higher than in the no-bequest case (shown in Figure 
19, right panel, solid line). Despite the fact that wealth is higher, she finds it optimal to increase her stock share 
because she does not care about the risk for the additional wealth that she is holding due to a bequest motive. 
Second, once we introduce mild risk aversion toward bequests (γb = 2, dashed line) the optimal stock shares are 
smaller than in the no-bequest case. Third, when we increase the risk aversion up to the level exhibited by the 
                                                 
17This follows the same logic that was explained in the second paragraph of this section; only this time wealth is increasing 
rather than decreasing. 
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utility from consumption (γb = 4, long-dashed line), we get a much lower stock share profile than in any of the 
other cases. 
 
The lesson we take from this comparison is that, if we model bequests by either a function exhibiting 
no risk aversion, or the same level of risk aversion as the consumption utility function18, then we would be 
severely restricting the life cycle asset allocation behavior the model can to generate. This will introduce serious 
biases in the estimates of the key structural parameters in a study that estimates a joint savings and portfolio 
choice model. To demonstrate this, suppose that the actual portfolio profiles look like the short dashed line in 
Figure 20: They are almost flat and may be slightly increasing. We actually have empirical evidence that this 
might be the case. (Ameriks and Zeldes (2004) and the in the AHEAD sample I use, which will be shown in the 
next section) If we force a linear bequest function or a bequest function that has identical risk aversion as the 
consumption-utility function to fit the life cycle portfolio data, then the only way for the model to fit the data 
would be by estimating an insignificant bequest motive. Furthermore, without bequests, the only way to match 
the flat wealth profile would then be to overestimate risk aversion and/or overestimate the discount factor. 
 
 
4. Data 
 
The data used to estimate the model are from the Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old 
(AHEAD) sub-sample of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) sample. The AHEAD subsample consists of 
individuals who were born in or before 1924, and were not institutionalized at the time of their first interview in 
1993-4. The respondents were reinterviewed in 1995-6, 1998, 2000, and 2002.19 There are a total of 8,397 
respondents of whom 5,322 are female. 
 
The analysis in this paper uses retired unmarried female respondents who appear in at least two 
consecutive waves. The model solves for next period wealth and asset allocation given current period wealth, so 
                                                 
18This is the assumption of almost all of the life cycle asset allocation studies in the finance literature. 
19The actual time period between two consecutive interviews varies between 12 and 39 months. Data from the 2004 
interview are not yet available. 
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a minimum of two observations per person is needed. I exclude observations in which the woman was younger 
than 70 or older than 102. The 1993 wave is dropped for reasons explained below.20 After these restrictions are 
applied the sample contains 5,094 observations on 2,384 women. Table 4 tabulates the women by the number of 
observations they contribute to the sample.  
 
The change in mean wealth from 1993 to 1995 is qualitatively and quantitatively strikingly different 
than the changes in other periods. From 1993 to 1995 mean wealth went up by 27% (from $117K to $148K), 
while it went down by 9% between 1995 and 1998, barely changed between 1998 and 2000, and went down by 
6% between 2000 and 2002. This is an important issue since in this paper we are trying to explain wealth 
changes and asset allocation and we cannot do so properly with questionable data. After doing extensive 
calculations, I found that underreporting of assets in 1993 data is the likely reason behind this anomaly and I 
decided not to use 1993 data to explain 1995 data.21, 22 My calculations showed that the high stock market 
returns cannot explain the 27% increase in wealth from 1993 to 1995. Hence, I estimate only 1998, 2000, and 
2002 wealth and asset allocation using data from the respective previous waves. 
 
I assume that income is constant in real terms. When we follow respondents over time, we see large 
variation in reported income for quite a few of them. This is most likely a result of measurement error, since the 
elderly are not subject to large swings in their income from Social Security, pensions, and annuities. Averaging 
over as many income observations as we have will reduce the measurement error. To do this, I dropped extreme 
observations on the components of income. Then, I calculated averages for each of these components.  Finally, I 
added them up to come up with the constant real measure of income I use. 
 
                                                 
20Further sample selection criteria eliminated a few more observations. These criteria are: nonnegative current and previous 
total wealth, total annual income not more than $74,000, and equity share of wealth less than or equal to 100%. Wealth and 
equity share restrictions are due to the model: An individual can never have negative net worth and he/she cannot be short or 
long on equities. The annual income restriction is to reduce the computational burden, and will be explained later. I also 
dropped extreme observations for total wealth (> $10,000,000) and annual income from pensions (>$70,000). 
 
21I do not completely throw out the 1993 data. Income data for 1993 do not have the same problems as the wealth data, and 
are used in income calculations as described below. 
 
22See Hurd and Rohwedder (2004) for a detailed analysis of the problems with the 1993 data. Kopczuk and Lupton (in 
press) also dropped the 1993 wealth data in their analysis of bequest behavior. 
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Table 5 provides a first glimpse of the data. The column labeled "1998" shows that there were 1,826 
AHEAD respondents who were interviewed both in 1995 and 1998, were at least 70 years old in 1995, were 
single in 1995 and remained single through the interview in 1998, and did not have any attachment to the labor 
force between 1995 and 1998. All dollar amounts are reported in 2002 dollars using the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics' all urban consumer price index. In the tables, "previous" refers to the previous interview. For 
example, previous total wealth in the 1998 column refers to total wealth in 1995. 
 
 
4.1. Are the Assets of the Elderly "Melting Down"? 
 
In Table 5, we see that mean wealth declines by 11% (from $162.9K to $144.5K) during 1995-1998, and does 
not change much during 1998-2000 and 2000-2002. Table 6 reports the 7-year changes in mean wealth from 
1995 to 2002 by age groups. The annual change in mean wealth is between 0.5 and -2.9%. At face value, these 
figures provide evidence that the elderly are dissaving, but at a slower rate than a standard life cycle model with 
neither bequests nor medical expenditure would predict, especially given the fact that these people are very old 
(in 2002 average age is over 85). 
 
The means might be heavily influenced by the wealthy minority of retirees who hold a 
disproportionately high share of total wealth in the sample. Looking at the changes in the median may give us a 
better idea about how the majority of the sample is doing. Tables 5 and 7 report 2-year and 7-year changes in 
median wealth, respectively.  The decumulation of wealth is much more pronounced and consistent in these 
tables. Table 5 shows that median wealth declined significantly in each period, and the fraction of the sample 
with zero wealth increased in each period between any consecutive waves. The increase in the number of people 
with no wealth was consistently between 10 and 20%. In Table 7, we see that between one 12 to 76% of median 
wealth is depleted within 7 years depending on age in 1995. The discrepancy between the changes in mean and 
median wealth suggests that the relatively poor majority and the wealthy minority have different wealth 
profiles. Two major reasons causing this discrepancy would be that saving behavior is different for these groups 
and that the wealthy group might be experiencing much different realized returns on their wealth. Wealthy 
  
  60 
individuals are the main stockholders and, as will be explained in the next section, the real annual return on the 
S&P500 index was 25% between 1995 and 1998, 12% between 1998 and 2000, and -19% between 2000 and 
2002. The first reason suggests an operative bequest motive for the wealthy, while the second reason suggests 
differences in realized returns might be the cause. This points out the importance of controlling for realized 
returns in order to draw robust conclusions about the presence and the strength of a bequest motive. 
Additionally, there is no support for a wealth decumulation rate that is increasing by age in the means, although 
there is support in the medians. 
  
 
4.2. How Do the Stock Shares Vary with Age? 
 
As they age, do the elderly behave in a way consistent with the common financial planners' advice (gradually 
move out of stocks) or with the model solution presented in this paper (increase stock shares if they are not as 
risk averse toward bequests as they are toward consumption)? This question is relevant only for a minority of 
the sample (about 20.0-23.1%, see Table 5) since most of the elderly do not own stocks. Table 5 shows that the 
mean share of stocks in wealth is only about 10%, yet about a fifth of total wealth is held in stocks. This is 
because the wealth distribution is skewed toward the right and it is mostly the people in the right tail of the 
wealth distribution who are the stock-owners. As for the stock-owners in consecutive waves, we see that about a 
third of their wealth is held in stocks. The mean share of stocks increased from 28.4% to 36.9% between 1995 
and 1998, stayed constant between 1998 and 2000, and increased again from 31.8% to 33.9% between 2000 and 
2002. So there is no evidence for moving away from stocks while aging.  Table 8 depicts how mean stock 
shares differ by age groups for those with nonzero current and previous wealth (the top panel), for those holding 
stocks in both waves (second panel), and for those holding stocks in at least one wave (bottom panel). There is 
no evidence that the elderly follow the advice of financial planners. Over the 7 years from 1995 to 2002, either 
there is either a flat or increasing portfolio profile. Furthermore, the older the individuals are in the initial year, 
the higher their stock share increase (panel 2), which is consistent with the model. 
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4.3. Stock Returns 
 
I used the Standard & Poor 500 index (taking into account dividends and splits) in constant dollars as an 
external data source to approximate the distribution for stock returns and to calculate the realized equity returns 
for the period when AHEAD respondents were interviewed. Assuming that the respondent buys $1 worth of the 
S&P500 index on the day of a given interview (which varies by individual) and keeps it until the day of the next 
interview day, the first row of Table 9 displays the mean return between adjacent interviews.23 Figure 21 shows 
the distribution of returns across all respondents and all interviews. Notice the large variation in stock market 
returns. Figure 22 depicts the evolution of the S&P 500 index and the periods when the AHEAD interviews 
were conducted. We note two things in Figure 22: First, the S&P 500 index is highly variable over this period. 
Second, the interview dates are scattered throughout the calendar year. These two facts and the fact that the 
periods between interviews differ substantially from respondent to respondent (from about 1 year to about 3 
years with mean of about 2 years), make it no surprise that the individual stock market gains show the large 
variation that we see in Figure 21. In Figure 21, the observations between -50% and -25% belong to the period 
2000-2002 when the stock market crashed. The lump around 65% corresponds to the period 1995-1998 when 
the stock market gains were highest. The biggest lump, which is around 25%, is for two periods, 1993-1995 and 
1998-2000. As explained in the previous section, the theoretical model is solved every year for the respondents. 
Due to high variability in stock returns it may be important for a model that is explaining wealth to take into 
account different interval lengths between interviews. I prorate consumption if the next period is not a whole 
year away. 
 
The second row of Table 9 presents the annualized returns that the respondents had realized at the 
current interview since the previous interview. I calculated the annualized return for individual i as follows: 
 
i
interviewsbetween  months #
12
i
i
i
interview) (previous index P500&S
interview)(current  index P500&SReturn Annualized )(=  
 
                                                 
23The actual time period between two consecutive interviews varies between 12 and 39 months. 
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Between 1993 and 1995 a respondent who held the S&P500 would have realized, on average, a 13% annual 
gain in the value of her stocks. That increased to 25% between 1995 and 1998, then dropped to 12% between 
1998 and 2000. With a 19% annual average loss, the 2000-2002 period was the worst for equity holders.  
 
 
5. Estimation 
 
Given data in an AHEAD wave k, the model is solved for consumption and the share of risky assets in the 
portfolio ("stock share" from this point on) for the next AHEAD wave, k+1. Since we observe wealth but not 
consumption, the optimal consumption value for each individual is substituted into the equation of motion for 
wealth to calculate predicted next-period wealth. The difference between the predicted wealth and the observed 
wealth forms the residual for the wealth equation. 
 
Predicted wealth in wave k+1 is written in terms of the model solution for consumption, Ck* and the 
stock share, xk* as 
 
1
*
1,
***
1 ))1()(( +++ −−+•−−+= kkkkkkkk OMXrxrxFECPCIWW , 
 
where P is an indicator variable for paying the fixed stock market entry cost for the first time, OMXk+1 is the 
out-of-pocket medical expenses for age k+1 paid at the beginning of age k+1, consumption is a function of 
observables and structural parameters as calculated in the model solution, 
),)}3,2,1;,{(),3,2,1;,(,,},{,(* W
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24
 pi, and ri are probabilities and supports, 
                                                 
24To save computation time, I used 102 as the maximum age that one can survive to. There is a non-zero probability that one 
may survive beyond age 102 conditional on being alive at 102. There were very few retirees in my sample that were 
observed at ages older than 102. I dropped them. 
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respectively, for the estimated discrete distribution of stock returns, and mpj,k and mxj,k are probabilities and 
supports, respectively, for the estimated discrete distribution of age (k) dependent out-of-pocket medical 
expenses.25   Wθ includes the structural parameters to be estimated from the wealth equation. 
 
r  and rk,k+1 are the rates of return on the risk-free and risky assets, respectively. The realized rate of return on 
stocks for the period between the interviews k and k+1 is measured by the rate of return on the S&P500 index 
over the same period. 
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Hence, we can write Wk+1* in terms of observables and structural parameters θW as: 
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We observe the individual's stock share in wave k+1. xk+1* in terms of observables and structural 
parameters is: 
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Xθ  includes the structural parameters to be estimated from the portfolio equation. 
 
Thus, the empirical equations are: 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
25The probabilities and supports are estimated outside of the model. 
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with the cross-equation restriction XC θθ ≡ , which is dictated by the consistency of the model. Wk 1+ε  and 
X
k 1+ε  are measurement errors in wealth and stock shares, respectively. 
 
The θ  vector in each equation consists of the parameters of the structural model. γ : the parameter for 
risk aversion for consumption, Bγ : the parameter for risk aversion for bequest, β : the time discount factor, 
ρ : the parameter for the strength of the bequest motive, andFEC : the fixed one-time stock-market entry cost. 
The consumption floor is fixed at $3,000. 
 
Since the wealth distribution is highly skewed to the right, I fit the log-wealth instead of level of 
wealth. However, as there are some observations with actual and/or predicted wealth equal to 0, the logarithm 
would not be defined for all. Thus, I use the transformation log(K+wealth), where K=1,10,100,1000. All of 
these K's give identical joint estimates of all parameters. However, they give slightly different estimates when 
the wealth equation is estimated separately. In reporting individual equation estimates, I use the results from the 
log(100+weath) transformation. 
 
I estimate the model using the method of Seemingly Unrelated Nonlinear Least Squares (Gallant 
1975). The estimation consists of 2 steps: In the first step, each equation is estimated separately and the cross-
equation covariance matrix of the error terms is calculated. In the second step, the two equations are estimated 
jointly with the inverse of the variance-covariance matrix calculated in step one used as a weighting matrix. 
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5.1. Prorating Predicted Variables 
 
The time between interviews is between 13 and 39 months. However, the model is solved annually.  So most of 
the time we observe the individual not exactly 12, 24, or 36 months after we previously observed her. Given the 
volatility and the booms and busts of the stock market, it becomes very important to prorate. It is also very 
important to prorate for another reason: Think about a retiree who has $100K when we first observe her. She 
has no income. We then observe her again in 18 months. For simplicity, let's assume that the model predicts that 
she would keep 80% of her wealth annually. Let's define SP=.8 where SP is per cent saved. If we do not prorate, 
we would either solve the model for her only once (corresponding to 12 months) or twice (corresponding to 24 
months). Predicted wealths are SP*100K=80K and SP2100K=64K respectively. However, in reality, it is 72K, 
much different than either of the above. Since one of the main objectives of this study is to adequately model 
returns as discussed in Section 4.3, I prorate Wk+1* and Xk+1* as follows: 
 
Assume that she is observed again after M months. τ = M/12 
 
Predicted risky asset in k+1 = RAk+1 = 
(SP500 index: first observed / SP500 index: next observed) [(1-τ+τ SP) Wk + (τ Income SP)] Xk 
 
Predicted riskfree asset in k+1= NAk+1 = 
(Risk-free rate)τ [(1-τ+τ SP) Wk + (τ Income SP)] (1-Xk) 
 
Thus, 
W*k+1 = RAk+1 + NAk+1  
X*k+1 = RAk+1 / W*k+1 
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6. RESULTS 
 
In this section, I present the point estimates of the structural parameters of the life-cycle model (Table 10), 
which were obtained by grid search. I discuss and compare them to other estimates in the literature. Then, I 
discuss the fit of the model. Finally, I explain the Social Security reform simulation and its implications for 
retiree welfare. 
 
 
6.1. Risk Aversion and Discount Factor 
 
The estimate for the relative risk aversion for consumption is 7.4, which is at the higher  end of the 
range of estimates provided in other studies of life-cycle models. Hurd (1989), French (2005), Cagetti (2003), 
Gourinchas and Parker (2002), van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2005), Blau and Gilleskie (in press), and Alan 
(2005) report estimates that are mostly between 1 and 7. Except for Alan (2005), none of the above papers 
model asset allocation. Alan (2005) solves a model of life cycle saving and asset allocation in order to estimate 
a stock market participation profile equation, but she does not use data on assets or asset allocation in 
estimation. Her estimate for risk aversion is 1.6, which is much lower than mine. It is well established in the 
finance literature that within a rational agent CRRA framework, only extremely risk-averse individuals would 
exhibit the observed behavior of holding little or no stocks. In order to fit the asset allocation equation, we need 
an estimate of risk aversion that is very high. Hence the major reason why my estimate is larger than the others 
is that I model asset allocation behavior jointly with saving. A model of wealth alone could fit the data with a 
lower level of risk aversion since we see in the raw data that people do spend down their wealth. Indeed, when I 
fit only the wealth equation, the risk aversion estimate is around 1, which is at the lower range of previous 
studies. When we estimate these two equations jointly, the asset allocation equation seems to dominate the risk 
aversion estimate and the two equations are reconciled by a very low discount factor, 0.7.26 This estimated 
discount factor is much smaller than the range of estimates found in the above-mentioned studies: 0.78 - 1.14. 
                                                 
26It should be noted that 0.7 was the smallest value tried in the grid search. 
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We should also keep in mind that in most previous studies, it was assumed that individuals hold a 
single risk-free asset with a fixed return. However, Ameriks et al. (2004) estimate that around half the U.S. 
population holds stocks and there is a large amount of variation in portfolio composition among stockholders. 
Moreover, there have been periods when the stock market boomed or crashed. In those periods, realized stock 
market returns were much higher or lower than historic averages. All of the studies above ignore this very large 
heterogeneity in expectations and realizations of asset returns and assume only one fixed rate of return. This 
misspecification of the asset returns process has the potential to bias the estimates of important parameters such 
as risk aversion, the discount factor, and the strength of the bequest motive. 
 
High risk aversion, a high discount factor, and a strong bequest motive can all generate a high and not 
very steeply-declining asset profile. If the realized asset returns are higher than what is assumed in the model, 
then the estimate of at least one of those three parameters will be biased upward. Moreover, even if the average 
realized return for the sample is equal to the assumed return, this bias does not go away. In this case, however, it 
is very hard to determine the direction of the bias. Still, given the particular way bequest functions are modeled 
in this literature, it may be possible to determine the direction of bias in the estimated bequest motive. Hurd 
(1989) and van der Klaauw & Wolpin (2005) use a linear bequest function. This function implies that only 
individuals who have wealth higher than some threshold level have an operative bequest motive. De Nardi 
(2004) and French (2005) use functions that imply an operative bequest motive for everyone, but wealthier 
individuals have a stronger bequest motive.27 Thus, in these studies, if the realized rate of return for the wealthy 
is higher than what is assumed (for example due to a run-up in the stock market), then the bequest motive is 
overestimated. 
 
Hurd (1989) uses a similar data set and similar estimation technique, and he finds much lower risk 
aversion (1.12). 28 The difference in the risk aversion estimate is mainly due to the fact that I model portfolio 
                                                 
27In my bequest function, this relationship between lifetime resources and bequests is not forced. However, the estimated 
parameters imply a similar relationship.  
 
28He uses data from the Retirement History Survey, 1969-1979. In 1969 household heads were between 58-63 years old. He 
uses only single individuals. 
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choice and he does not, but there could be another factor contributing to this difference.29 He assumes a riskless 
annual rate of return of 3% between 1969 and 1979. The S&P500 dividend/splits-adjusted annual real rate of 
return for that period is -5.5%. One way for the model to match the observed rate of wealth decline with an 
assumed rate of return of 3% is a low risk aversion estimate 
 
There is one study from which we can get some idea about the magnitude of the bias in the bequest 
parameter due to misspecification of the returns: French (2005) uses 1984, 1989, and 1994 asset data  from the 
PSID to estimate a structural life cycle model. Between 1984-1989 the annual rate of return on stocks was 14%. 
In solving and estimating the model he assumes a 4% rate of return. Thus he might be overestimating the 
bequest motive. In his sensitivity analysis, he reduces the assumed rate of return by one percentage point and re-
estimates the model. He finds that the bequest parameter is halved. 
 
In Table 10, I also provide the estimates when both equations are estimated separately. The estimates 
are significantly different. In particular, risk aversion estimate from the wealth equation (0.7) is much lower 
than the estimate from the portfolio equation (6.6). Both are relatively reasonable if thought independently. This 
highlights the limitation of the constant relative risk aversion type utility function: The same parameter (risk 
aversion) is governing both wealth and portfolio paths. In general, wealth dynamics depend on intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution, while optimal portfolio shares depends on risk aversion. This type of utility function 
assumes that the former one is the reciprocal of the latter. This proves to be a too restrictive assumption. The 
estimates imply that this restriction might not be true. As a test of model’s consistency, I statistically test the 
hypothesis that parameters from separately estimated equations are equal. There are five parameters estimated 
for each equation and the model implies that they are equal. I calculate the sum of squared residuals (SSR) 
twice: Once without the equality restriction (SSRunrestricted=10198.17), and once with the equality restriction 
(SSRrestricted=11583.57). In each case I use the same estimated weighting matrix. The difference between these 
two SSR’s (which is 1385.4) is distributed as Chi-square with 5 degrees of freedom. (See Gallant, 1987 for 
details.) For a P-value of 0.001, Chi-square value is 20.52. Hence, the model’s implication is strongly rejected. 
So, the parameter estimates and the simulations I present should be taken cautiously. 
                                                                                                                                                       
 
29
 Note that my risk aversion is around 1 if I estimate the wealth equation separately. 
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6.2. Fixed Stock Market Entry Cost 
 
The estimated one-time fixed cost of stock market entry is $350,000. The monetary cost of setting up an 
account such as brokerage fees, etc. contributes to this cost. There may also be time costs: the value of time 
spent to understand the stock market, acquire information about the risks and returns, etc. But these costs cannot 
possibly sum to $350,000. There are many wealthy individuals in the data who do not hold stocks. This implies 
that there are "psychic" costs involved, and the $350,000 cost should be interpreted as the monetary equivalent 
of the psychic cost of holding stock. Why is this cost unreasonably too high? In the data, only 4% of the retirees 
who have not paid this cost decide to hold stocks. If people do not hold stocks, then they do not change their 
behavior. One reason might be that most of my sample consists of widowed old women (average age is 84). 
Their spouses might have made the decisions about stock market participation when they were alive. Once their 
spouses passes away, these women may choose not to decide whether to holding stocks or not and may simply 
go with the status quo. We may probably need data for younger individuals in order to get a better estimate of 
this parameter. Nevertheless, including this feature in the model, significantly helps match the mean of 
conditional stock shares with relatively reasonable degrees of risk aversion. 
 
The only other study to estimate the fixed cost of entry to the stock market in the context of a structural 
life cycle model is Alan (2005). Her estimate of the fixed entry cost is 2.15% of permanent income, which 
amounts to about $288 for the mean income ($13,400) in my sample. However, the only moment in the data 
that she attempts to fit in her estimation is the mean stock market participation rate by age. She does not use 
asset data, or the share of stocks in the portfolio. She does not report the wealth and portfolio allocation profile 
that is implied by her model and whether those profiles match the data. If the implied asset profile is 
counterfactually low, then the entry cost estimate will be biased towards zero. Moreover, individuals in her data 
set were much younger (ages 24-56). At younger ages wealth accumulation is minimal and more individuals 
will be liquidity constraint. Moreover, the risk aversion coefficient of 1.6 estimated by Alan implies that 
individuals will put almost all of their wealth in stocks once they pay the fixed cost, which is not what we 
observe in the data. Thus, counterfactually, they expect a very high benefit for participating in the stock market. 
This will lead to underestimating the fixed cost.  
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6.3. Is There a Bequest Motive? 
 
I simulate the behavior of individuals with and without the bequest motive and compare them in order to see the 
impact of having a bequest motive. 30 In particular, consider three unmarried female 70-year-old retirees who 
differ by their financial resources. The "median" retiree has the sample median wealth of 70-74 year olds 
($100,000), and has no income other than a social security benefit of $10,400. The "mean" retiree has the 
sample mean wealth of the same age group ($200,000) and has a $15,000 annuity, of which $9,500 is the Social 
Security benefit. The "wealthy" retiree has the 90th percentile wealth ($460,000) and income ($25,600, of 
which $11,600 is Social Security benefit) of the sample. Consumption, the share of stocks, wealth, and stock 
holding paths are drawn in Figures 23, 24, and 25, corresponding to the median, mean, and wealthy retirees, 
respectively.  All these paths are almost identical with or without the bequest motive. The bequest motive seems 
to have no effect. However, it would be premature to conclude at this point that there is no bequest motive. It is 
possible that there would still be a strong bequest motive, however it may not show up in the simulations when 
we turn it off. Agents may be keeping some of their wealth as a precaution against future medical expenses and 
this may be large enough to satisfy the bequest motive, too. Note that saving has a dual purpose here. It is a 
bequest if you die, and extra wealth if you do not. In order to isolate the effect of bequests, I drop the medical 
expenditure from the model and simulate behavior with and without a bequest motive at the estimated 
parameters. The results are in Figures 26, 27, and 28. We still do not see any significant effect of bequests. 
Hence, I conclude that estimated parameters imply that there is no bequest motive.31 All the saving has been 
picked up by modeling medical expenditure risk.  
 
Comparing my bequest estimate to Hurd's: He also found no bequest motive, but probably for a 
different reason. As I explained in Section 6.1, he assumes only one rate of return, 3% between 1969 and 1979 
even though S&P500 annual real rate of return for that period was -5.5%. The segment of the population that is 
hit hard from this rapid fall in the stock market index is the wealthy (since mostly they hold stocks). Since 
                                                 
30To simulate behavior without a bequest motive, I turn off the bequest motive by setting α = 0 and hold the other 
parameters fixed at the estimated values. 
31If I had re-estimated the model without out-of-pocket medical expenditure risk, the model would have been seriously 
misspecified and we would have been very likely to find a significant effect of bequest motive. 
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wealthy individuals have an operative bequest motive by design if a linear bequest function is assumed, one 
way to reconcile a 3% return with a decline in wealth is absence of a bequest motive. 
 
 I should note that even though the parameters of the jointly estimated wealth and portfolio equations 
imply that there is no bequest motive, each of the separately estimated equations imply a significant bequest 
motive. This should not come as a surprise, since the cross-equation restriction imposed by the theoretical 
model was rejected in Section 6.1. 
 
 
6.4. Behavioral Implications of Medical Expenditure32 
 
In Figures 29, 30, and 31 I depict the effect of medical expenditures on consumption, portfolios, wealth, and 
stock levels. I shut down the bequest motive in order to isolate this effect.33 Introducing medical expenses has a 
profound impact on all variables. 
 
It significantly reduces the optimal fraction of wealth held in the risky asset. This is due to the fact that 
medical expenditure risk is a significant additional risk on top of return risk, and retirees adjust their exposure to 
risk by lowering the stock shares. 
 
It also makes people retain large portions of their wealth until they are very close to certain death.34 
The wealth paths are almost flattened. Note that medical expense risk has the biggest effect on wealth for the 
"median" retiree (wealth=100K) and less effect on the "mean" retiree (wealth=200K) and the least effect on the 
"rich" retiree (wealth=460K). This is because even the maximum possible amount of medical expense (around 
35K at age 102) can be covered relatively easily by the "rich", but not by the "mean". 35K is a lot for the 
                                                 
32In this section, I only show the fit in terms of the means. Though not shown, it is worth noting that the fit in terms of the 
medians is at least as good as the fit in terms of the means. 
 
33Note that, I actually do not need to shut bequests down, since practically they do not exist. 
 
34At the end of life, once they realize that they are not going to live any longer, they spend the wealth they saved for medical 
expenses. 
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"median" retiree and hence she is affected the most. It is interesting to mention that for a really poor retiree (say 
wealth=40K and income=0, Figure 32), the opposite is true: She saves more when there is no medical expense 
risk. She even consumes more. This is the effect of the consumption floor. If the person has very low resources 
so that whatever she saved to the next period is very likely to be completely wiped out by a medical expense 
shock, she does not save. She relies on the fact that government will step in to cover that big shock.  
 
 
6.5. Model’s Fit 
 
The top row of Figure 33 shows predicted and actual mean and median wealth by interview year, age, 
and income, respectively. The model fits quite well along these dimensions. The fit of the model to portfolio 
allocation patterns is fairly good: see Figure 34. 
 
There are 1,196 retirees who own stocks and are also predicted by the model to own stocks. The 
conditional mean stock share is 34%, and the model predicts 29%. Examining the distribution of actual and 
predicted conditional stock shares (Figure 37) reveals that the model does not capture the fraction of the sample 
that has very high shares of stocks, nor does it capture the large fraction of the sample whose stock shares are 
almost zero. The model predicts that once a retiree decides to hold stocks she holds a share that is not very close 
to zero. Including a per-period transaction cost, heterogeneity in entry cost, and in risk aversion could 
potentially help the model fit better along this dimension. The overall stock market participation rate is 
predicted to be 33.8% whereas the actual rate is 26.4%. 
 
A stricter measure of how well the model fits is to predict 2002 wealth and portfolio allocation using 
only 1995 data. Given the extreme stock market returns experienced over those years, the model could easily 
wander away from the true values. Notice in Table 9 how extreme the annual returns are: 24.9% between 1995-
1998, 12.0% between 1998-2000, and -19.4% between 2000-2002. There were 1185 women in the estimation 
sample who were interviewed both in 1995 and 2002. Their mean wealth drops from $180.0K in 1995 to 
$157.6K in 2002. The model forecast of 2002 wealth conditional on 1995 wealth is $115.7, which is within 
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27% of the actual value. The model does not perform well along this dimension. The actual stock market 
participation rate was 25.4% in 2002 and the model predicts it to be 30.7%.  
 
An even stricter test of the model fit is to forecast the behavior of people who were not in the 
estimation sample. Since I have data on males and have not used them during estimation, I forecast their 
behavior both in 2-year intervals (top row of Figure 35 for mean wealth and bottom row of Figure 35 for 
median wealth) and the 6.5-year interval (1995 to 2002; not shown in  the figures). There were a total of 1,087 
males in the 2-year forecasting sample and 214 males in the 6.5-year forecasting sample. As Figure 35 shows 
the forecasts are reasonably good. The 6.5-year forecast of wealth is $119.5K whereas the actual mean wealth 
was $180.0K (within 34% of the actual value). As was the case for females, the model does not perform well in 
forecasting wealth for extended periods. Actual wealth falls by 16% whereas the model forecasts the fall to be 
44%. The 6.5-year forecast of the average stock share is 12.3% whereas the actual one is 10.6% (For details, see 
Figure 36). 
 
 
6.6. Policy Simulations 
 
I use the model to simulate the impact of creating individual accounts in Social Security, since this is currently 
being debated in policy and academic circles. To mimic such a Social Security reform I consider the following 
simulation: cut the Social Security benefit of a 70-year old retiree by a given amount and give her a lump sum 
equal to the expected present discounted value (EPDV) of the benefit cut. It is important to point out that if a 
perfectly functioning private annuity market exists, the retiree would simply pay the lump sum as the premium 
to purchase a single premium immediate life annuity that pays a lifelong fixed real income stream that is 
identical to the benefit cut. However, it is well established that the annuity market is very thin. Actuarially 
unfair pricing, adverse selection, over-annuitization, and irrational behavior on the part of households are some 
of the leading causes that have been put forward in the literature. Hence, I will present two sets of simulation 
results: one with no access and one with access to the private annuity market for inflation-adjusted annuities. 
The policy question I will be answering for both cases is the following: Will the retiree be better off, since she 
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can invest the lump sum in assets that have high average returns? The answer provided by the model is no for 
both cases. The value of having guaranteed annuity payments in case the individual lives longer than expected 
is greater than the value of getting those future payments as a lump sum and investing them in high-return risky 
assets.35 Related to this, I also find that a typical retiree is optimally annuitized and thus she does not want a 
change in the system. Wealthier retirees, however are severely under-annuitized and thus would prefer the 
opposite reform! The mean retiree would prefer to increase her income from 15K to 23K buy buying actuarially 
fair annuities that are worth 52% of her wealth (her wealth is 200K). The median retiree would prefer to 
increase her income from 25.6K to 45.6K buy buying actuarially fair annuities that are worth 57% of her wealth 
(her wealth is 460K). 
 
 
6.6.1. No Access to the Private Annuity Market 
 
Consider again the three types of retirees illustrated previously: median, mean, and wealthy. Assume that the 
Social Security system is changed so that they will be receiving a Social Security benefit of only $6,000 
(arbitrarily chosen) instead of their actual benefit. The EPDV of the difference is paid to them as a lump sum. 
This lump sum amounts to $57,600, $45,800, and $73,300 for the "mean", "median", and the "wealthy" retirees, 
respectively. First of all, I find that if a retiree did not participate in the stock market before the reform, she will 
still not participate after the reform. I calculate the dollar amounts a retiree is willing to pay to participate in the 
stock market as $8000, $15,000, and $31,000, for the median, mean, and wealthy retirees, respectively. Since 
the entry cost is estimated to be much larger ($350,000) than what they are willing to pay, they will not own 
stocks after the reform if they are not holding stocks before. This eliminates an important potential benefit of 
the reform for the non-stockholders (who are the majority). Moreover, the already-low stock shares of the 
stockholders are predicted to be even lower (slightly) after the reform, because the reform reduces their risk-free 
                                                 
35The actuarially fair lump sum will only be enough to keep retirement income at the pre-reform level for about 14 years, 
which is about the expected remaining years of life at age 70. However, the probability of living longer than the expected 
life at age 70 is around 44%. Conditional on being alive at age 70, the probabilities of reaching age 90, 95, and 100 are 
about 30%, 10%, and 3%, respectively, for the 1923 female birth year cohort. 
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guaranteed income and increases their potential wealth.36 This reduces the potential benefit thought to come 
from having access to high returns for stockholders.   
 
The estimates imply that this reform would reduce all three types of retirees' welfare. In Table 11, I 
present the welfare implications of the reform in terms of calculated dollar amounts each type of retiree is 
willing to pay to avoid the reform, and how much extra they should be given to keep their welfare constant. 
First, consider the retirees who have not paid the entry cost. The median retiree would be willing to pay $10K, 
which is 10% of her wealth to avoid this reform. To keep her welfare constant, the government would need to 
pay about 19% more than the actuarially fair amount in converting $4,400 of her annuity payments into cash. 
Comparing column 1 and 4, 2 and 5, and 3 and 6 reveals that having access to the stock market does not alter 
the welfare implications of this reform, however it makes it less painful. This implies that having the option of 
investing this lump sum in high-return risky assets does have some value, but not enough to accept the reform. 
This is true for the wealthy mostly because the lump sum is small compared to her wealth. In Figure 38, we see 
for the "median" retiree that, the optimal stock share is slightly reduced after the reform due to losing a risk-free 
financial resource (annuity). 37  Thus the benefit is limited. The same story holds for the "mean" and the 
"wealthy" retirees (in Figures 39 and 40, respectively). 
 
Overall, the benefits of the reform will be limited due to reluctance to hold stocks. The cost of the 
reform, on the other hand, seems to be moderately severe. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
36This is the result of portfolio rebalancing due to lower risk-free resources and higher risky financial wealth. 
 
37At first look to the Figure 21, this does not seem to be true for ages over 85 for the "median" retiree. However, keep in 
mind that (before the reform), increasing number of retirees run out of wealth as they age beyond 85 since they do not have 
much wealth to start with and also they have relatively sizable annuity that they can depend on. Thus, some of them do not 
leave any wealth to the next period, and by my definition their stock shares is zero. In reality it is undefined (0/0). After the 
reform, however, retirees do not run out of wealth as quickly, since they need to keep more of it in order to make up for the 
lost annuity. Thus, stock shares are defined for more of them and this is the only reason their stock shares seem to be higher 
than pre-reform shares after age 85. 
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6.6.2. Private Annuity Market Is Available 
 
There are some inflation-adjusted annuities available in the market that would potentially provide annual 
payments identical to Social Security benefits. In the welfare analysis, I used the quotes for such annuities from 
Vanguard since they were available online. I found that if the retiree purchases a single premium inflation-
adjusted immediate life annuity from Vanguard, she can replace only 76.9% of her Social Security benefit cut. 
Hence, Vanguard charges 23.1% of the EPDV of the benefit cut. It may not be correct to simply assume that the 
retiree would use all of her lump sum payment to purchase the annuity. Thus, I calculated the corresponding 
optimum fraction. I found that the median retiree (who was optimally annuitized) would buy an annuity with 
one quarter of the lump sum. Meanwhile, the mean and the wealthy retirees (both are severely underannuitized) 
would want to use all of the lump sum to buy annuities. This implies that after the reform all retirees are under-
annuitized. The welfare calculations are shown in the bottom block of Table 11. In summary, having access to 
the private annuity market makes individuals significantly better off. However, the reform is still undesirable 
due to the actuarially unfair pricing of the annuities. 
  
 
7. Conclusions 
 
In this study, I combined the insights and approaches from the economics of aging and finance literatures to 
analyze in some detail the saving and asset allocation behavior of elderly households. These behaviors are 
becoming increasingly important to understand, as the rapidly aging U.S. population will be placing significant 
strains on the social insurance system, and as policy makers have started considering reforms to alleviate these 
strains. For example, in order to properly evaluate the proposed Social Security reforms of creating individual 
accounts and cutting benefits we need to take into account how the individuals will adjust their portfolios and 
saving decisions in response to the reform. 
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I develop a life cycle model of saving and asset allocation with some additional key features. A fixed 
cost of stock market entry is one of these features that are intended to explain observed non-participation in the 
stock market. The other important feature is a generalized bequest function that has its own risk aversion 
parameter in addition to the one for consumption. This generality is important in order to better understand 
portfolio choice since we will want to pay attention to the effect of a bequest motive on portfolio choice. Out-
of-pocket medical expenditure risk, which may have a very strong effect on wealth dynamics, is also modeled.  
As a first in the literature, I estimate the structural parameters of a saving and portfolio allocation model using 
longitudinal micro data by explicitly solving the stochastic dynamic programming problem of retired elderly 
individuals. The model fits the data reasonably well along most of the important dimensions. I find that there is 
no bequest motive. Thus the reason for any slow decumulation of wealth during the 1990s is either 
precautionary saving against possible future medical expenses, or persistently high return shocks or both. The 
model also explains the high stock market non-participation and the low shares of stocks in elderly portfolios. 
 
The model used in this paper is a very rich version of a standard life cycle model based on constant 
relative risk aversion utility (CRRA). Even though this model fits the data reasonably well, it is rejected by the 
data. The cross-equation restrictions that are required for internal consistency are strongly rejected. This is 
mainly due to the fact that, in CRRA, a single parameter - coefficient of relative risk aversion - governs both the 
shape of the wealth path and the level and shape of the portfolio path. On one hand, a very high level of risk 
aversion is required to explain portfolio choices. On the other hand, a very low level of risk aversion is required 
to explain wealth dynamics. My results imply that utility functions that have separate parameters governing 
portfolio and wealth paths (such as Epstein-Zin utility) should be employed to try to explain joint saving and 
portfolio decisions.  
 
Despite its internal inconsistency, the model is one of the richest versions of the standard model and I 
use the estimates to do some policy simulations with caution. I used the estimates to simulate the impact of 
reducing the Social Security benefit of a 70-year old female retiree by a specific amount, and giving her a lump 
sum equal to the expected present discounted value of the benefit cut, which is to be invested in her individual 
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account. I find that this reform would be undesirable. Main reason behind this is that, most retirees are either 
optimally annuitized or under-annuitized. 
 
This study has some limitations due to simplifying assumptions and omissions, which were needed for 
the feasibility of the study. In particular, omitting housing wealth as a distinct asset probably causes upward 
bias in the estimated level of risk aversion. Reluctance to decumulate wealth is taken here as evidence of a 
higher risk aversion, but some households may be holding onto their houses because transaction costs or 
housing service utility they get from housing causes them to do so.  I also assumed that there are no taxes and 
no per-period stock market transaction costs, and that initial wealth is exogenous.  
 
As for future work, it would be interesting to estimate the same model without asset allocation. That 
would allow us to assess the severity of the biases in key structural parameters of omitting the large observed 
endogenous heterogeneity in asset allocations in life cycle models of saving. The findings in this paper suggest 
there might be heterogeneity in the stock market entry cost and risk aversion. I plan to investigate this 
possibility in future work. A challenging and very interesting extension of this work would be to model 
retirement jointly with savings and asset allocation. That would help us to understand the interactions between 
retirement, savings, and asset allocation behaviors. 
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TABLE 4: Sample Composition 
 
 Number of persons % Number of observations % 
     
111 1,068 45 3,204 63 
110 339 14 678 13 
101 2 0 4 0 
100 417 17 417 8 
011 233 10 466 9 
010 88 4 88 2 
001 237 10 237 5 
Total 2,384 100 5,094 100 
 
An observation is two adjacent waves. First, second, and third 0/1's indicate 
appearance in the 1995-1998, 1998-2000, and 2000-2002 waves, respectively. 
0: does not appear in the particular 2-adjacent-wave data 
1: appears in the particular 2-adjacent-wave data 
 
TABLE 5: Selected Averages for Successive Panels of the AHEAD Data 
 
   1998   2000   2002 
    
age 83.2 84.1 85.2 
previous age 81.0 82.0 83.0 
wealth ($000) 144.5 162.5 177.3 
previous wealth ($000) 162.9 161.9 179.7 
wealth (median) ($000) 54.2 58.8 61.7 
previous wealth (median) ($000) 64.2 65.2 68.6 
% with 0 wealth 13.0 11.5 11.6 
% with 0 previous wealth 10.7 10.6 9.7 
stocks ($000) 27.8 40.1 36.9 
previous stocks ($000) 28.0 32.6 40.6 
% with any stock market participation 20.0 23.1 23.0 
previous % with any stock market participation 22.2 22.3 25.3 
% share of stocks in wealthA 10.2 10.8 10.4 
previous % share of stocks in wealth 8.5 10.5 10.9 
% share of stocks in wealthB 36.9 32.7 33.9 
previous % share of stocks in wealth 28.4 32.8 31.8 
% of total wealth held in stocks 19.3 24.7 20.8 
previous % of sample wealth held in stocks 17.2 20.1 22.6 
annual income ($000) 12.4 13.1 13.5 
number of observations 1,826 1,728 1,540 
A For those with nonzero current and previous wealth                                   B For those holding stocks in both waves 
C
 Note that mean wealth in 2000 is different than mean previous wealth in 2002, etc. Mean wealth in 2000 calculated 
for retirees who appear in both 1998 and 2000, while previous mean wealth in 2002 is calculated for retirees who 
appear both in 2000 and 2002. A retire may be in 1998 and 2000 data, but not in 2002 data either because she died, 
not observed, or had invalid entry for at least one of the variables in either 2000 or 2002. 
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TABLE 6: Change in Mean Wealth by Age between 1995 and 2002 
 
 Age in 1995 
 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90+ 
      
Mean wealth in 1995 ($ 000) 188.5 184.2 161.0 154.8 223.1 
Mean wealth in 2002 ($ 000) 195.7 154.1 147.0 132.8 182.0 
% change in mean wealth between 1995-2002 3.8 -16.3 -8.7 -14.2 -18.4 
% annual change in mean wealth between 1995-2002 0.5 -2.5 -1.3 -2.2 -2.9 
Number of observations 220 424 331 167 48 
 
 
TABLE 7: Change in Median Wealth by Age between 1995 and 2002 
 
 Age in 1995 
 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90+ 
      
Median wealth in 1995 ($ 000) 105.7 80.2 67.3 62.6 73.8 
Median wealth in 2002 ($ 000) 92.8 50.2 43.0 15.0 36.5 
% change in median wealth between 1995-2002 -12.2 -37.4 -36.1 -76.0 -50.5 
% annual change in median wealth between 1995-2002 -1.8 -6.5 -6.2 -18.5 -9.6 
Number of observations 220 424 331 167 48 
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TABLE 8: Change in Mean Stock Share by Age between 1995 and 2002 
 
 Age in 1995 
 70-74 75-79 80-84 85-89 90+ 
Stock share in 1995 (%)a 10.9 9.3 9.5 10.2 11.9 
Stock share in 2002 (%)         11.5 9.0 10.8 11.8 12.2 
Number of observations 188 367 273 125 40 
Stock share in 1995 (%)b 26.3 32.6 29.8 31.7 33.2 
Stock share in 2002 (%) 28.9 37.8 40.2 42.7 34.5 
Number of observations 70 75 58 29 14 
Stock share in 1995 (%)c 21.9 24.0 23.6 26.6 30.3 
Stock share in 2002 (%) 22.2 22.7 26.6 30.1 28.6 
Number of observations 97 147 111 49 17 
a For those with nonzero current and previous wealth 
b For those holding stocks in both waves 
c
 For those holding stocks in at least one wave 
 
 
 
 
TABLE 9: S&P500 Returns Over the Interview Years 
 
 YEAR 
 1995 1998 2000 2002 
Mean value on the interview date of $1 invested in equities 
on previous interview date $1.28 $1.65 $1.26 $0.63 
Annualized return for the above 13.1% 24.9% 12.0% -19.4% 
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TABLE 10: Estimates of the Structural Parameters (standard errors in paranthesis) 
 
 Joint Estimates Wealth Equation 
Portfolio 
Equation 
γ : Risk aversion for consumption 7.4 (0.041) 
0.7 6.6 
β : Discount factor 0.7 (0.005) 
0.91 0.7 
ρ : Scaling factor of bequest 3.4x10
-28
 
(5.81x10-29) 
0.0255 6.35x10-14 
γ : Risk aversion for bequest 1.85 (0.019) 
.35 3.3 
FEC : Fixed stock market entry cost ($000) 350 (31.5) 
350 350 
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TABLE 11:  Welfare Effects of the Social Security Reform On a 70-Year Old Female Retiree who has the Median, Mean, and the 
90th Percentile Wealth and Income of the Sample 
 
  Whether the one-time fixed stock market entry cost 
has been paid  before 
 (All levels in $000) Paid Not Paid 
  median mean rich median mean rich 
Wealth 100 200 460 100 200 460 
Annual income (before reform) 10.4 15.0 25.6 10.4 15.0 25.6 
     S.S. income 10.4 9.5 11.6 10.4 9.5 11.6 
     pension income - 5.5 14.0 - 5.5 14.0 
Annual income (after the reform)  6.0 11.5 20.0 6.0 11.5 20.0 
     S.S. income 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 6.0 
     pension income - 5.5 14.0 - 5.5 14.0 
Lump sum payment (PDV of benefit cuts) 57.6 45.8 73.3 57.6 45.8 73.3 
Private Annuity Market does NOT Exist       
Amount willing to pay to avoid the reform (equivalent variation) 8        17 50 10 20 52 
     % of wealth 8 9 11 10 10 11 
Additional cash - over the actuarially fair lump sum - required to make her 
voluntarily accept the reform (compensating variation) 
9 18 49 11 21 72 
      % of lump sum 16 39 67 19 46 98 
Private Annuity Market Exists       
Amount willing to pay to avoid the reform (equivalent variation) 7 14 26    
     % of wealth 7 7 6    
Additional cash - over the actuarially fair lump sum - required to make her 
voluntarily accept the reform (compensating variation) 
 
8 
 
11 
 
28 
   
     % of lump sum 14 24 38    
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Figure 19 Wealth & Portfolio Trajectories for Various Levels of Risk Aversion 
when There Are No Bequests 
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Consumption Gamma : risk aversion parameter for CRRA preferences for consumption
 
 
Figure 20 Wealth & Portfolio Trajectories for Various Levels of Risk Aversion 
 toward Bequests (The Level of Risk Aversion for Consumption is fixed at 4) 
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Bequest Gamma :     risk aversion parameter for CRRA preferences for bequests
Bequest Alpha     :     strength/scale parameter for bequests
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Figure 21 
 
The Variation in S&P Returns Caused by Having 
Different Interview Dates for a Given Individual 
and a Given Wave 
 
   Figure 22 
 
   AHEAD Field Periods vs. S&P500 Index 
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Figure 23 The Simulated Impact of Bequests for the "Median" Retiree 
   Who Has Already Paid the Stock Market Entry Cost 
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Figure 24 The Simulated Impact of Bequests for the "Mean" Retiree 
   Who Has Already Paid the Stock Market Entry Cost 
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Wealth=$200,000 Income=$15,000 ($9,500 SS + $5,500 private pensions)           *Share of stocks is smoothed for clarity.
 
 
Figure 25 The Simulated Impact of Bequests for the "Wealthy" Retiree 
   Who Has Already Paid the Stock Market Entry Cost 
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Wealth=$460,000 Income=$25,600 ($11,600 SS + $14,000 private pensions)           *Share of stocks is smoothed for clarity.
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Figure 26 The Simulated Impact of Bequests for the "Median" Retiree 
   Who Has Already Paid the Stock Market Entry Cost 
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Figure 27 The Simulated Impact of Bequests for the "Mean" Retiree 
   Who Has Already Paid the Stock Market Entry Cost 
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Wealth=$200,000 Income=$15,000 ($9,500 SS + $5,500 private pensions)           *Share of stocks is smoothed for clarity.
NO MEDICAL EXPENDITURE RISK
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Figure 28 The Simulated Impact of Bequests for the "Wealthy" Retiree 
   Who Has Already Paid the Stock Market Entry Cost 
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Figure 29 The Simulated Impact of Medical Expenses for the "Median" Retiree 
   Who Has Already Paid the Stock Market Entry Cost 
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Figure 30 The Simulated Impact of Medical Expenses for the "Mean" Retiree 
   Who Has Already Paid the Stock Market Entry Cost 
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Wealth=$200,000 Income=$15,000 ($9,500 SS + $5,500 private pensions)           *Share of stocks is smoothed for clarity.
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Figure 31 The Simulated Impact of Medical Expenses for the "Wealthy" Retiree 
   Who Has Already Paid the Stock Market Entry Cost 
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Figure 32 The Simulated Impact of Medical Expenses for the "Poor" Retiree 
   Who Has Already Paid the Stock Market Entry Cost 
 
0
5
10
15
20
70 80 90 100
age
With Medical Exp
Without Medical Exp
($000)
Consumption
0
10
20
30
40
70 80 90 100
age
With Medical Exp
Without Medical Exp
($000)
Wealth
Median wealth and income; no private pensions
Wealth=$40,000 Income=0
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
91
 
Figure 33 Predicted vs. Actual Mean and Median Wealth for the Estimation Sample by YEAR, AGE AND INCOME 
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Figure 34 Predicted vs. Actual Mean Stock Share for the Estimation Sample by YEAR, AGE AND INCOME 
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Figure 35 Forecasted vs. Actual Mean and Median Wealth for Out-of-Sample Males  by INTERVIEW YEAR, AGE, AND, INCOME 
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Figure 36 Forecasted vs. Actual Mean Stock Share for Out-of-Sample Males by INTERVIEW YEAR, AGE, AND, INCOME 
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Figure 37 Comparison of the Distributions of 
  Predicted and Actual Conditional Stock Shares 
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Figure 38 Simulated Impact of the Social Security Reform on the "Median" 
Retiree Who Has Already Paid the Entry Cost** 
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Median wealth and income; no private pensions                                                  * Share of stocks is smoothed for clarity.
Wealth=$100,000 Income=$10,400                                                                     ** No access to the private annuity market.
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Figure 39 Simulated Impact of the Social Security Reform on the "Mean" 
Retiree Who Has Already Paid the Entry Cost** 
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Mean wealth and income                                                                                                 * Share of stocks is smoothed for clarity.
Wealth=$200,000 Income=$15,000 ($9,500 SS + $5,500 private pensions)              ** No access to the private annuity market.
 
 
Figure 40 Simulated Impact of the Social Security Reform on the "Wealthy" 
Retiree Who Has Already Paid the Entry Cost** 
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Wealth=$460,000 Income=$25,600 ($11,600 SS + $14,000 private pensions)            ** No access to the private annuity market.
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APPENDIX: 
 
TABLE 12: Probabilities of being in the low, medium, high medical expenditure 
categories 
 
 
Age P(Expense<1000) P(Expense≥1000 
and 
Expense<11000) 
P(Expense≥11000) 
70 0.659 0.332 .009 
71 0.657 0.333 .010 
72 0.655 0.334 .011 
73 0.654 0.334 .013 
74 0.652 0.334 .014 
75 0.650 0.334 .016 
76 0.648 0.334 .018 
77 0.646 0.334 .020 
78 0.643 0.334 .023 
79 0.640 0.334 .025 
80 0.638 0.334 .028 
81 0.635 0.334 .032 
82 0.631 0.333 .036 
83 0.628 0.332 .040 
84 0.624 0.332 .045 
85 0.620 0.331 .050 
86 0.615 0.329 .056 
87 0.610 0.328 .062 
88 0.604 0.326 .070 
89 0.598 0.324 .078 
90 0.592 0.322 .086 
91 0.585 0.319 .096 
92 0.577 0.316 .107 
93 0.569 0.313 .119 
94 0.560 0.309 .132 
95 0.550 0.305 .146 
96 0.539 0.300 .161 
97 0.528 0.295 .177 
98 0.516 0.289 .195 
99 0.503 0.283 .214 
100 0.489 0.276 .235 
101 0.464 0.269 .257 
102 0.448 0.262 .280 
 
 
 
 
 
 98
 
TABLE 13: Mean expense levels for each expense category 
 
 
Age Low Expense Medium Expense High Expense 
70 318 2700 23013 
71 315 2709 23431 
72 312 2718 23848 
73 309 2727 24266 
74 306 2736 24684 
75 303 2745 25101 
76 300 2754 25519 
77 297 2763 25936 
78 294 2773 26354 
79 291 2782 26771 
80 288 2791 27189 
81 285 2800 27607 
82 282 2809 28024 
83 279 2818 28442 
84 276 2827 28859 
85 273 2836 29277 
86 271 2845 29694 
87 268 2854 30112 
88 265 2863 30530 
89 262 2872 30947 
90 259 2881 31365 
91 256 2890 31782 
92 253 2899 32200 
93 250 2908 32617 
94 247 2917 33035 
95 244 2926 33453 
96 241 2935 33870 
97 238 2945 34288 
98 235 2954 34705 
99 232 2963 35123 
100 229 2972 35540 
101 226 2981 35958 
102 223 2990 36375 
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